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ABSTRACT
Transparency in healthcare relates to formally reporting medical errors and disclosing
bad outcomes to patients and families. Unfortunately, most physicians are not in the habit of
communicating transparently, as many studies have shown the existence of a large medical error
information gap. Research also shows that creating a culture of transparency would mutually
support patient safety and risk management goals by concomitantly reducing medical errors and
alleviating the malpractice crisis.
Three predictor variables are used to represent the various dimensions of the context just
described. Perfectionism represents the intrapersonal domain, socio-organizational climate
represents the interpersonal and institutional domains, and medico-legal environment represents
the societal domain. Chin and Benne’s normative re-educative strategy provides theoretical
support for the notion that successful organizational change hinges upon addressing the structural
and cultural barriers displayed by individuals and groups.
The Physician Transparency Questionnaire was completed by 270 physicians who were
drawn from a multi-site healthcare organization in Central Florida. Structural equation modeling
was used to determine whether perfectionism, socio-organizational climate, and medico-legal
environment significantly predict two transparency outcomes, namely, error reporting
transparency and provider-patient transparency.
Perfectionism and socio-organizational climate were found to be statistically significant
predictors. Collectively, these variables accounted for nearly half of the variance in each
transparency outcome. Within socio-organizational climate, policies had the greatest influence
iii

on transparency, followed by immunity and professional norms. Multiple group analysis showed
that the covariance model developed in this study generalizes across gender, medical specialty,
and occupation. In addition, group means comparisons tests revealed a number of interesting
trends in error reporting and disclosure practices that provide insights about the behavioral and
cognitive psychology behind transparent communication: 1) Physicians are more inclined to
engage in provider-patient transparency compared to error reporting transparency, 2) physicians
are more inclined to report serious errors compared to less serious errors, and 3) physicians are
more inclined to express sympathy for bad outcomes than they are to apologize for a preventable
error or be honest about the details surrounding bad outcomes.
These results suggest that change efforts would need to be directed at medical education
curricula and health provider organizations to ensure that current and future generations of
physicians replace the pursuit for perfectionism with the pursuit for excellence. Also, a number
of institutional changes are recommended, such as clearly communicating transparency policies
and guidelines, promoting professional norms that encourage learning from mistakes rather than
an aversion to error, and reassuring physicians that reporting and disclosure activities will not
compromise their reputation. From the perspective of patient safety advocates and risk
managers, the results are heartening because they emphasize a key principle in quality
improvement - i.e., small changes can yield big results.
From an ethical standpoint, this research suggests that healthcare organizations can
inhibit (or facilitate) the emergence of professional virtues. Thus, although organizations cannot
make a physician become virtuous, it is within their power to create conditions that encourage
the physician to practice certain virtues. With respect to leadership styles, this research finds that
iv

bottom-up, grassroots change efforts can elicit professional virtues, and that culture change in
healthcare lies beyond the scope of the medico-legal system.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
From an ethical standpoint, transparent communication allows physicians to fulfill their
professional responsibilities to tell the truth. Unfortunately, transparency is not a normative
practice, as is evidenced by a healthcare system that is rife with error underreporting and a lack
of error disclosure. However, heightened concerns for medical errors and medical malpractice
have spawned a sudden and marked interest in creating a culture of transparency.

Significance of the Problem
Medical Errors
Several landmark studies have brought the US healthcare system under intense scrutiny.
The Harvard Medical Malpractice Study estimated the incidence of adverse events in
hospitalized patients to occur at a rate of 3.7 percent, and also reported that 27.6 percent of
adverse events were a result of negligence (Brennan et al., 1991). In 1999, the Institute of
Medicine (IOM) released its report suggesting that medical errors in the US result in as many as
98,000 deaths per year and are considered a leading cause of death. Healthgrades reported that
among Medicare patients alone, patient safety errors cost this federal program $8.8 billion and
238,337 preventable deaths between the years 2004 and 2006 (Shapiro, 2008). This research
also found that 1.1 million medical errors occur annually and that three percent of Medicare
patients are victims of iatrogenesis. Moreover, the recent finding that 44 percent of adverse
events are preventable (Office of Inspector General, 2010) suggests that the potential to improve
patient safety is enormous.
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Researchers have argued that medical error statistics are exaggerated. McDonald,
Weiner, and Hui (2000) indicate that most patients who are admitted to hospitals are prone to
death and disease before they are even admitted. Moreover, they suggest that the research that
produced the IOM’s error statistics are flawed which therefore invalidates the conclusions in
their report. For example, some of this research was based solely on observational techniques
(i.e. reviewing medical records retroactively); whereas other studies did not make use of control
groups. As such, it is unclear whether certain adverse outcomes actually cause death or whether
they are merely correlated with death.
The reverse has also been argued, namely that medical error estimates are underestimated
(Leape, 2002). In light of the finding that 20 to 40 percent of autopsies reveal potentially fatal
misdiagnoses, Leape (2000) argued that a considerable number of errors are never brought to the
physician’s attention. Also, the use of medical records to ascertain error rates can actually
deflate error estimates given that not all errors are recorded on medical records. It is also
important to consider that some medical errors are privately experienced by the physician, given
that mistakes which do not produce serious harm are more likely to go unnoticed.
In the end, it may not be productive to argue about the precision of medical error rates. A
more responsible approach is to err on the side of patient safety and make concerted efforts to
reduce the incidence of error in medicine.
Medical Malpractice
There is a pressing need to reduce medical malpractice litigation activity in our nation’s
healthcare system. The Kaiser Family Foundation (2009) reported that during 2008, the US
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healthcare system paid out 11,021 settlements averaging $327,034 per claim, for a total annual
payout exceeding $3.6 billion. Additionally, the average length of time spent on litigation cases
is more than two years (Press & DeFrances, 1997). A host of problems stems from the high level
of litigious activity, including marked increases in physicians’ professional liability insurance
rates: One study reported that from 2000 to 2003, our nation’s median increase for the price of
basic general surgery malpractice coverage was 29 percent (Dranove & Gron, 2005).
Elevated professional liability insurance rates have adverse effects on access to care and
healthcare quality. It has been shown in some states that over 52% of physicians are practicing
defensive medicine by decreasing or eliminating their use of riskier clinical procedures, most
notably in the areas of surgery and obstetrics (Brooks, Menachemi, Hughes & Clawson, 2004);
whereas others have reported that elevated professional liability insurance rates are causing
physicians to flee to other states or close down their medical practices altogether (Dranove &
Gron, 2005).
Another by-product of excessive malpractice litigation relates to the well-being of health
provider organizations: Research has shown that malpractice litigation is associated with job
stress in healthcare organizations. In one study, it was reported that hospital departments with a
current record of malpractice litigation reported higher levels of job stress compared to similar
departments having no such records (Jones, Barge, Steffy, Fay, Kunz, & Wuebker, 1988). A
subsequent study found a positive correlation between workplace stress levels of hospital
employees and the incidence of malpractice claims. Thus, considering the detrimental effects of
job stress, including decreased job satisfaction and morale, and increased turnover, it is clear that

3

malpractice litigation has economic ramifications that extend far beyond those associated with
litigation fees.

Why Transparency Matters in Healthcare
Transparency relates to the quality of communication that takes place in healthcare
settings between patients, physicians, and external reporting agencies. In some instances,
transparency is not necessarily the best policy, as is the case with truth-telling. In the context of
this study, transparency relates to the frequency and consistency of disclosure practices and the
level of honesty in the communication of bad outcomes and preventable medical errors. Given
that the ultimate goal in this research is to diminish malpractice litigation and medical error rates,
a high level of transparency is assumed to be the best course of action. Unfortunately, research
has amply shown that our healthcare system is plagued with error underreporting and a lack of
error disclosure (Gallagher et al., 2006b; Hobgood, Hevia, Tamayo-Sarver, Weiner, & Riviello,
2005; Lawton & Parker, 2002; Taylor et al., 2004).
Overall, the literature on transparency provides enough reason for one to believe that
transparent communication is an effective deterrent of medical errors and an effective risk
management tool. Research has shown that transparent communication improves the providerpatient relationship and thus creates a buffer against litigation activity (Kachalia et al. 2010;
Gallagher et al., 2006c; Wu, 1999). As far as medical errors are concerned, the IOM (2000) has
made it abundantly clear that the more we know about medical errors the more we can do to
prevent them. In the context of total quality management, medical errors are referred to as
“gems” (Leape, 1994) and “medical treasures” (Blumenthal, 1994).
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The literature also suggests that medical errors and medical malpractice are the byproducts of a medical error information gap (Perez & DiDona, 2010) which can be eliminated
though physicians’ consistent and continuous engagement in transparent communication with
colleagues, patients, and external reporting agencies. Research has also revealed a large number
of barriers to transparency (Kaldjian, Jones, Rosenthal, Tripp-Reimer, & Hillis, 2006),
suggesting that a systemic overhaul would be needed to change the culture in healthcare.
As compelling as the arguments in favor of transparency appear, convincing physicians
to adopt transparency is a tall order. In addition, relying exclusively on rational appeals will not
endow physicians with enough moral courage to continually engage in comprehensive medical
error reporting and disclosure. Instead, the first step towards establishing a culture of
transparency is to acknowledge the pervasiveness of the problem by identifying the true nature of
the barriers to transparency.

Rationale and Research Questions
The type of change that is needed to establish transparency should take into consideration
that the barriers to transparency are systemic and pervasive (Liang, 2002). In other words, a
systemic problem calls for a robust solution. In light of this, the present study sets out to define
the most appropriate and effective change strategy for establishing a culture of transparency in
healthcare by developing a theoretical framework that reflects the systemic nature of the
problem. The purpose of this study is therefore to examine the associations between physicians’
propensities for transparency and the intrapersonal, interpersonal, institutional, and societal
barriers to transparency. Thus, the research questions that will guide this study are:
1) What are the psycho-social predictors of transparency?
5

2) What is the relative importance of each predictor?
Identifying the most significant barriers transparency can inform healthcare leaders about
where to direct their change efforts. For instance, if individual factors are found to predict
transparency, this might suggest that change efforts should be directed at modifying medical
education curricula. If organizational factors are found to predict transparency, then healthcare
leaders may have to revise policies in the work environment. Lastly, if societal factors are found
to predict transparency, then the recommendation would be that legislators and policy-makers
should play a larger role in the pursuit for transparency.
To date, several researchers have classified factors associated with transparency. Jeffe
and colleagues (2004) conducted a study using physician-based focus groups that identified six
barriers and six facilitators related to error reporting, most of which related to organizational
policies. It is not clear whether the researchers also inquired about disclosing bad outcomes to
patients.
A more in-depth analysis is provided by Kaldjian and colleagues (2006) who uncovered
59 facilitating and impeding factors that affect physicians’ willingness to disclose errors. These
factors were categorized into one of eight domains: Responsibility to patient, responsibility to
profession, responsibility to self, responsibility to community, attitudinal barriers, uncertainties,
helplessness, and fears and anxieties.
Barach and Small (2000) conducted a similar study in non-medical settings where
barriers and incentives to error reporting were identified at the individual, organizational, and
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societal levels. The barriers and incentives were classified as legal, cultural (i.e. attitudes,
values, beliefs), regulatory, and financial.
Several shortcomings in each of these studies provide the impetus for the research
questions in the present study. First, a holistic analysis of factors that are associated with
transparency in healthcare has yet to emerge, namely, one that includes individual and contextual
variables. Second, research has yet to quantify the relationship between the predictors of
transparency and transparency outcomes.
Third, although many researchers have thus far suggested reasons why transparency is
not yet normative, the taxonomies produced in each study do not identify the relative importance
of each factor. As mentioned earlier, determining which factors are more predictive of
transparency can inform change agents about where to direct their efforts. Lastly, the
taxonomies of transparency factors do not distinguish between those that account for error
disclosure to patients from those that pertain to formal error reporting. Thus, in the context of
this study, transparency is conceived as two separate constructs: Provider-patient transparency
and error reporting transparency.
Despite the aforementioned shortcomings, the findings produced in each study laid the
groundwork for the present research by identifying factors that might be responsible for
transparency. As such, some the factors identified by Barach and Small (2000), Jeffe and
Colleagues (2004), and Kaldjian and colleagues (2006) were categorized according to the
domains represented in the theoretical model applied herein (i.e., individual, socioorganizational, and societal). The prior delineation of factors also facilitated the development of
questionnaire items that were included in the Physician Transparency Questionnaire.
7

Theoretical Context
This study is supported by two organizational change theories: Lewin’s force field
analysis and Chin and Benne’s normative re-educative strategy.
In the context of this study, Lewin’s theories are descriptive. Lewin (1958) proposes that
change happens when driving forces are weaker than restraining forces. When the two forces are
equivalent, the organization can only maintain the status quo. In the context of this study,
Lewin’s theory suggests that forces that drive transparency encounter forces that inhibit
transparency, ultimately suggesting that change agents should either increase the number of
facilitating factors or decrease the number barriers to transparency.
The second theory is Chin and Benne’s (1985) normative re-educative strategy. In the
context of this study, the normative-re-educative strategy is prescriptive. It proposes that norms,
values, attitudes, and relationships must be addressed in order to achieve organizational change.
The theory also proposes that organizational change must occur within the system, and between
the system and its external environment. In the context of this study, the normative re-educative
strategy suggests that transparency efforts must take into account individual, group, and societal
factors, and pay attention to fundamental structures in the culture (e.g. attitudes) in order to be
considered effective.

Scope of the Study
In this study, transparency is defined as the degree to which the physician engages in
formal error reporting and error disclosure to patients and families. Non-random samples of
physicians were drawn from a multi-site hospital system in Central Florida.
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A correlational research design will be used to determine the degree of relationships
between three predictor variables, namely, perfectionism, socio-organizational climate, and
medico-legal environment; and two outcome variables, namely, provider-patient transparency
and error reporting transparency.
Considering that there are no known instruments that measure these variables, the
Physician Transparency Questionnaire (PTQ) was created for the specific purposes of this
research. The items in the PTQ were derived from several studies which support the idea that
perfectionism, socio-organizational climate, and medico-legal environment are related to
transparency. The PTQ is a paper-and-pencil questionnaire that contains 37-items that measure 5
factors. All items except for demographic questions use a five-point Likert scale.
SPSS will be used to conduct descriptive analyses Cronbach internal reliability tests, and
group means comparisons tests. AMOS will be used to perform confirmatory factor analysis
which will ascertain the construct validity of each variable. Following this, covariance structure
modeling will be performed to estimate the relationships between the predictor and outcome
variables.

Expected Findings
In this research, perfectionism, socio-organizational climate, and medico-legal
environment are defined as barriers to transparency. As such, perfectionism, socioorganizational climate, and medico-legal environment are expected to be negatively associated
with error reporting transparency and provider-patient transparency.
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This study will also investigate differences in the propensity for transparency among
different types of medical errors (i.e., no harm, minor harm, hospitalization, and life threatening)
and among different provider-patient transparency activities (i.e., the use apology, sympathy, and
honesty in disclosing bad outcomes).
To date, only a handful of studies have undertaken the task of measuring the propensity
for transparency among physicians. A lot of variation exists in the way that transparency is
measured. Some studies measure transparency by gauging physicians’ responses to specific
hypothetical clinical scenarios (e.g. Blendon et al., 2002), whereas others have gauged
physicians’ responses to generic definitions of medical errors and adverse outcomes (e.g.
Gallagher et al., 2003).
As a result, there is little consensus on how to measure transparency. Also, a
transparency scale has yet to be validated and established in healthcare. Thus, the PTQ may
potentially inform researchers and patient safety experts about the most effective and accurate
way to measure the propensity for transparency.

Definitions of Key Terms
Perfectionism: Degree to which physician holds perfectionist beliefs.
Socio-Organizational Climate: Perceived interpersonal and institutional barriers to transparency.
Medico-Legal Environment: Perceived societal barriers to transparency.
Provider-Patient Transparency: Propensity to communicate honestly about bad outcomes with
patients and families.
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Error Reporting Transparency: Propensity to formally report medical errors.
Medical Error: Failure of a planned action to be completed as intended or the use of the wrong
plan to achieve an aim (Institute of Medicine, 2000). This excludes intentional and reckless
actions that harm the patient.
Bad Outcome: Preventable and non-preventable medical error.
Error Reporting: Formally disclosing an error to a internal or external reporting system.
Disclosure: Disclosing a bad outcome to a patient and/or their relatives.
No Harm Error: An error that had the potential to harm but did not.
Minor Harm Error: An error causing an injury that is easily treated and has no lasting effects.
Hospitalization Error: An error causing hospital admission or prolonged hospital stay.
Life-Saving Intervention Error: An error that was life threatening that resulted in a successful
life-saving intervention.

Chapter Summary
Transparency refers to the quality of communication in healthcare as it relates to formally
reporting medical errors and disclosing bad outcomes to patients and families. The lack of
transparency in healthcare is problematic because of its association with medical errors and
medical malpractice. Research shows that enhancing transparent communication is an effective
way to enhance patient safety and healthcare quality, and is also considered an effective
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malpractice risk management tool. In order to identify the myriad of barriers to transparency,
this research sets out to identify to psycho-social barriers transparency.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEWAND THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK
Medical Errors and Malpractice Litigation: A Root Cause Analysis
A complex system of barriers has been identified in relation to physician transparency. In
the subsequent section this system is discussed in terms of intrapersonal, interpersonal,
institutional, and societal-level barriers that together can undermine transparency and the sense
of psychological safety that is necessary for effective disclosure and learning from error.
Intrapersonal Barriers: Psycho-Social Profile of Physicians
The best place to start investigating physicians’ tendencies to adopt the deny-and-defend
approach to communicating errors and bad outcomes is in medical school, where physicians are
in the formative years of their careers, and where attitudes, beliefs, and professional virtues are
likely to shape. It may seem strange to propose further education to some of the most highlytrained professionals; however, education takes on many forms, and one of those is learning that
knowledge does not automatically translate into success and professionalism.
The medical education environment has been questioned for failing to develop good
moral character in medical students. Ensuring that physicians develop morally sound work
virtues would guide them in their medical practice by encouraging them to act in others’ best
interests, and possibly deter them from engaging in deviant behaviors. One cohort study
assessed undergraduate medical students’ moral reasoning skills in their first and third years of
medical school. The findings revealed a significant decline in moral development by the end of
year three (Patenaude, Niyonsenga, & Fafard, 2003). Even more disappointing are the findings
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that medical school might decrease ethical sensitivity (Hebert, Meslin, & Dunn, 1992), and that
most medical students feel pressured to act unethically (Hicks, Lin, Robertson, & Woodrow,
2001).
Other studies have revealed medical students’ perceptions that the ethical dilemmas they
encounter in clinical settings - even though they are recognized as being problematic - cannot be
discussed with their clinical teachers. For example, focus group sessions uncovered that medical
students are often afraid of their clinical teachers and are thus reluctant to question the morality
of the clinical situations they encounter (Hicks et al., 2001). These findings suggest the existence
of a hidden curriculum that inhibits medical students from developing ethical and professional
virtues that are critical to career development in medicine (Self, Schrader, Baldwin, & Wolinsky,
1993).
Several scholars have questioned the quality of student-teacher relationships in medical
school. For example, research shows that 53% of residents experience public humiliation or
belittlement by senior residents during their internship (Daugherty, Baldwin, & Rowley, 1998)
and that medical education is characterized by a hierarchical and competitive atmosphere
(Lempp & Seale, 2004). In addition, the Morbidity and Mortality Conference is often an
example of an educational initiative that often uses shame to discourage medical errors
(Goldberg, Kuhn, Andrew, & Thomas, 2002).
While these findings undoubtedly do not describe the experience of every student
physician, they do provoke serious questions about the nature of medical education and urge us
to consider what constitutes a healthy learning environment for medical students. Overall, the
findings suggest that unhealthy socio-academic experiences might stimulate the emergence of
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defensive personality structures that inhibit physicians from engaging in transparent
communication. In other words, we must ask ourselves: If the medical education system
underemphasizes psychologically safe learning environments that support moral development,
and if physicians are trained - albeit inadvertently - to constantly protect themselves against
criticism, then what is the likelihood that they will own up to medical errors in the future?
These findings demonstrate that physicians’ professional virtues and psychosocial
profiles are at odds with the American Medical Association code of ethics, specifically, with
principle that physicians have a duty to ensure that patients’ needs are placed ahead of
professional interests (American Medical Association, 2009). It seems that a strong ethical
foundation and an interpersonal sensitivity are indispensable to the goal of instituting
transparency in healthcare.
Although several studies identify a lag in physicians’ moral development, an alternative
explanation for poor transparency is that most physicians have good intentions; the problem is
that they encounter attitudinal barriers that discourage error reporting and disclosure. A recent
study identified taxonomies of factors that affect physicians’ willingness to disclose errors.
Specifically, it was found that perpetuating perfectionism, fearing the possibility of looking
foolish in front of junior colleagues or trainees, and fearing a sense of personal failure, loss of
self-esteem, and threat to one’s identity as a healer were significant barriers to transparency
(Kaldjian, Jones, Rosenthal, Tripp-Reimer, & Hills, 2006).

David Hilfiker became well-known as a result of publishing an unusual article about his
experiences with medical errors. Not surprisingly, Hilfiker’s article receives a great deal of
attention as he is one of the few physicians to have openly discussed his professional mistakes.
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In this article, he makes the following poignant statement about the ubiquitous pursuit for
perfectionism in medicine:
“This perfection is a grand illusion, of course, a game of mirrors that everyone
plays. Doctors hide their mistakes from patients, from other doctors, even from
themselves. Open discussion of mistakes is banished from the consultation room,
from the operating room, from physicians’ meetings. Mistakes become gossip,
and are spoken of openly only in court. Unable to admit our mistakes, we
physicians are cut off from healing. We cannot ask for forgiveness, and we get
none. We are thwarted, stunted; we do not grow… But if we are unable to deal
openly with those that do occur, we will find neurotic ways to protect ourselves
from the pain we feel. Little wonder that physicians are accused of playing God.
Little wonder that we are defensive about our judgments, that we blame the
patient or the previous physician when things go wrong, that we yell at nurses for
their mistakes”. (Hilfiker, 1984, p.120-121)
McKegney (1989) described medical education as an “abusive and neglectful family
system” that is characterized by expectations of perfectionism, denial, indirect communication
patterns, rigidity, and isolation. He also argued that dysfunctional teaching styles are inherited
and passed along from one generation of educators to the next. Thus, medical educators have
been striving to identify these dysfunctional dynamics and integrate new training and
development principles that mutually support technical and professional moral development.
For example, the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education has incorporated
a number of competencies into educational curricula, including: compassionate, appropriate,
and effective patient care; practice-based learning and improvement of interpersonal and
communication skills to work effectively with patients, families, and other professionals;
professionalism with respect to compassion, integrity, and respect for others; and accountability
to society and the profession (Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, 2007).
Integration of these concepts as core components of medical school curricula were an important
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step in laying the foundation for a professional culture of transparency. Robust evaluations of
such policy changes are needed, however, to most accurately evaluate their impact.
Interpersonal Barriers: Physician-Patient Relationships
A significant portion of malpractice litigation is caused by a relational breakdown
between the patient and the provider (Liebman & Hyman, 2004). Medical liability studies have
shown that patients’ and families’ decisions to sue their physician stems from the occurrence of
an injury coupled with the perception that the physician communicated poorly and was
insensitive in handling the incident (Vincent, Young, & Phillips, 1994). This study also found
that 37% of those who sued their physician felt that an apology would have eliminated their need
to seek legal retribution. Similarly, other research has found that 24% of families who sued their
physician for perinatal injuries believed that the physician had concealed the details surrounding
the incident (Hickson, Clayton, Githens, & Sloan, 1992).
Patients will initiate malpractice litigation because their physician failed to admit or
apologize for an error. When physicians react to an adverse outcome with silence, this
compromises the patient’s dignity and erodes trust in the provider-patient relationship (Wu,
Cavanaugh, McPhee, Lo, & Micco, 1997). Moreover, seeing that patients generally expect
explanations for adverse outcomes, a lack thereof increases their willingness to sue the physician
in order to obtain that information (Cohen, 2004). Lastly, it has been argued that some victims
of medical errors are concerned that unless the physician admits responsibility, they will likely
repeat the error in the future (Cohen, 2004). Hence, some patients feel that it is their duty to sue
in order to protect the well-being of other patients.
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Kavaler and Spiegel (2003) pointed out that approximately 88 percent of lawyers
handling malpractice cases stated that their plaintiffs (i.e. patient and/or family) were surprised
by the adverse outcome, which suggests the possibility that physicians are not adequately
informing their patients about the consequences of treatments and procedures. Moreover, they
found that 80 percent of malpractice lawyers claimed that physicians had failed to respond to
their patients’ complaints. Kavaler and Spiegel emphasize that communication between doctors
and patients must be improved, and suggest that physicians should always maintain eye contact
and refrain from interrupting the patient when they are speaking, so as to convey to the patient
that their concerns have been acknowledged.
The Sorry Works Coalition (http://www.sorryworks.net/) is an advocacy organization for
disclosure, apology, and upfront compensation for adverse medical events. Their mission
statement conveys that the nature of the malpractice crisis is in reality a customer service
problem, therefore implying that malpractice problems can be alleviated by healing the
interactions between patients and providers (Wojcieszak, Banda, & Houk, 2006). Hence, part of
the solution is to implement in-house apology and disclosure training programs where physicians
are taught to communicate bad outcomes to patients and families in an honest and proactive
manner. Studies of such programs have documented reductions in claims and liability costs, as
well as benefits for providers themselves (Kachalia et al. 2010; Gallagher et al., 2006c). For
example, nearly 75% of clinicians reported feeling relief after disclosing a serious event to their
patient (Gallagher et al., 2006c), suggesting that disclosure can be an important mechanism for
facilitating the emotional healing of both patients and physicians.
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However, we should not presume that the physician is exclusively responsible for
unhealthy doctor-patient dynamics. Oftentimes, patients have unrealistic expectations about
treatments and therefore place impossible demands on the physician, which in turn makes it hard
for the physician to be candid about errors. Blumenthal (1994) describes an implicit “social
contract” in medicine where the patient grants the physician extraordinary power and decisionmaking authority in exchange for an error-free practice. This suggests that the initial physicianpatient encounter should include a frank discussion about what should and should not be
expected about treatments and outcomes. This also highlights that the current trend towards
patient-centered care has the potential to reduce the physician’s burden of care and hopefully,
take us one step closer to achieving transparency.
Institutional Barriers: Healthcare Culture and Policies
Healthcare organizations operate in a climate that is characterized by norms that
perpetuate fear, blame, and secrecy (Horns & Loper, 2002; Sibbald, 2001; Wei, 2006), and the
end result is a system that is plagued with error reporting gaps (IOM, 1999). Historically,
healthcare professionals have been reluctant to express sympathy, remorse, or responsibility for
adverse outcomes on the advice of attorneys, insurance companies, and hospital administrators.
These groups promulgated the belief that admissions of fault and expressions of regret would
invite litigation because such statements could be used in court as evidence of medical
malpractice (Sparkman, 2005). An example of this is illustrated by the following clause that is
included in some malpractice insurance policies: “The insured shall not, except at his own cost,
make any payment, admit any liability, settle any claims, assume any obligations, or incur any
expense without the written consent of the company” (American Institute for CPCU, 1998,
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p.416). Physicians have also feared that having an open and honest conversation about a medical
error would lead to loss of malpractice insurance coverage or increased premiums (Boothman,
Blackwell, Campbell, Commiskey, & Anderson, 2009).
Patient safety advocates are increasingly recognizing the importance of establishing
cultures where trust and open communication are the norm (Gallagher, Studdert, & Levinson,
2007). For instance, the IOM has recommended that the collection of a wide range of error data
through computerized systems is the most effective way to eliminate medical errors.
However, asking physicians to report medical errors is a tall order. Naturally, fears of
legal and financial liabilities inhibit physicians from being outspoken about their clinical
mistakes (Kaldjian, Jones, Rosenthal, Tripp-Reimer & Hillis, 2006), and not surprisingly, studies
investigating physicians’ attitudes and intentions to report errors have shown that their
willingness to report increases when they believe that disclosure will not be met with a punitive
response (Garbutt et al., 2008). This suggests that in order to create an atmosphere that engenders
openness from health professionals, leaders of health provider organizations should provide
physicians with some form of immunity and support once they report an error. Immunity in this
sense however, does not imply freedom from accountability.
At the same time, studies have shown that patients expect error disclosure (Hobgood,
Peck, Gilbert, Chappell, & Zhou, 2002; Mazor, Simon, & Gurwitz, 2004) and moreover, prefer
that error reports be released publicly (Blendon, DesRoches, & Brodie, 2002) so as to better
inform their decisions about choosing a health provider. Although public reports might ensure
performance accountability and protect patients from negligent physicians, we must not forget
that confidential error reporting systems are one mechanism with the potential to reduce the
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hostility of the medico-legal environment and therefore encourage transparency. Thus, the
challenge for healthcare leaders is to strike a balance between professional accountability and
patient safety.
Healthcare leaders can start by creating an atmosphere that is conducive to error
reporting; that is, by creating a culture that expects and rewards transparency, and where it is
expected that peers and leaders support those who report and admit errors. Confidential error
reporting is intended first and foremost to enhance patient safety by uncovering systematic flaws
and creating a culture that is learning-oriented. Specifically, Weaver (2011) defined supportive,
learning oriented patient safety climates as those in which: (1) providers perceive that the
response to error by peers and leaders will be non-punitive, (2) there is an explicit emphasis on
approaching error with a learning orientation and a salient commitment to continuous learning
from defects and glitches, (3) there is explicit feedback and communication regarding error and
proactive discussions regarding how the next patient could be harmed, and (4) providers perceive
that their team members work effectively as a cohesive unit toward shared patient safety goals.
Empirically, units with a supportive learning climate were found to be the safest in a study of 84
units sampled from seven hospitals (Weaver, 2011). Overall, developing and promoting a
patient safety culture that is supportive and learning-oriented is one strategy that unit and
organizational leaders can use to facilitate transparency.
Societal Barriers: Medico-Legal Environment
Several researchers have reported that the legal environment is a major determinant of
disclosure behavior. For instance, Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough (2001) demonstrated that
the legal environment significantly influences disclosure practices in the area of management. In
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this study, management earnings forecast disclosures were compared between the US and
Canada. These countries are considered to operate in similar business climates yet are said to
have different legal climates in the sense that the judicial interpretations create a far less litigious
environment in Canada than in the US. The findings revealed that in Canada, there is a higher
frequency of management earnings forecast disclosures than in the US, and furthermore, that
Canadian managers make more precise and more long-term forecasts compared to managers in
the US.
Several factors explain why Canadian physicians practice in a much less litigious
environment than US physicians. As mentioned earlier, physicians in the US face constant
threats of escalating insurance premiums and loss of insurability (Mello, Studdert, & Brennan,
2003). An even more noteworthy difference between these countries is that their differing tort
reforms result in US physicians being four times more likely to be sued compared to Canadian
physicians (Coyte, Dewees, & Trebilcock, 1991; Picard & Robertson, 1996).
The US medico-legal climate is filled to the brim with litigious patients and lawyers.
This in turn has exacerbated the malpractice crisis as physicians are under the constant threats of
incurring a damaged reputation, legal punishment, and financial losses. Malpractice tort reforms,
such as capped damage awards, have been met with little success. As a result, legislators have
designed several policies that are meant to curb medical errors and alleviate the malpractice
crisis by influencing physicians’ communication habits. For instance, state legislators are
enacting laws to encourage error reporting.
According to the National Academy of State Health Policy (2007), state legislators are
enacting laws that mandate reporting behaviors among physicians in order to improve patient
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safety and increase accountability for errors. As of 2007, error reporting was mandatory in 25
states (Rosenthal, Takach, & Portland, 2007). Mandatory systems may be ineffective, however,
because they are often perceived as being designed to identify and punish “bad” physicians and
facilities rather than as a mechanism to actively correct and learn from errors (Cohen, 2000).
A closer look at these statutes reveals that for the most part, only serious errors must be
reported. According to the Institute of Medicine (2000) however, collecting data on less serious
errors is indispensable to enhancing patient safety. For one thing, minor errors are more frequent
and numerous and thus provide analysts with more information to understand the nature of
medical errors. Moreover, research has shown that less serious errors are more likely to be
reported altogether (Garbutt et al., 2007), seeing that they are less likely to invoke feelings of
guilt and shame among physicians. Lastly, many states face a number of challenges including
small numbers of error reports, and a lack of clinical expertise and other resources that are
critical for identifying error trends (Rosenthal & Booth, 2005).
As an alternative to mandatory reporting, patient safety experts have emphasized
voluntary reporting systems as a means to achieve quality improvement goals. Their argument is
that voluntary systems are more effective and provide better information for reducing medical
errors (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2003) because they allow physicians to
report in-error depth information without fears of reprisal (Cohen, 2000). Despite these
arguments, as of 2007 Oregon was the only state to enact a voluntary reporting system
(Rosenthal et al., 2007).
At the federal level, the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act (PSQIA) was
enacted in 2005 and described as a “giant leap for changing the culture and improving the quality
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of care delivered in our health care entities” (Mattie & Ben-Chitrit, 2007). In essence, the
PSQIA established voluntary, confidential reporting systems whereby Patient Safety
Organizations (PSO) could collect data on patient safety events, analyze errors, and identify best
practices. However, the effectiveness of PSOs is yet to be determined. Although 65 PSOs have
been listed since 2009, few have begun to receive patient safety data or have even entered into
contracts with health services organizations (US Government Accountability Office, 2010).
In an effort to mend the provider-patient relationship and to curb the medical malpractice
problem, 36 states have also enacted so-called apology laws (Mattie & Ben-Chitrit, 2007).
Simply put, an apology law is a statute that allows physicians to express sympathy and regret and in some cases admit responsibility - without having their statements used against them in
court. As such, the apology law is meant to create an environment that is less litigious.
Research on the impact of apology laws is scant. One study demonstrated that apology
laws have no significant impact on claims rates (Perez & DiDona, 2009), while a more recent
study found that apology laws reduced the amount of the time needed to settle cases by roughly
20 percent, and decreased average claims payments for serious injury cases by 14 to 17 percent
(Ho & Liu, 2011). The effectiveness of apology laws is questioned on the merits that legislators
are too remote from the delivery of healthcare services to significantly impact physicians’
behavior (Perez & DiDona, 2009). Another problem is that there are holes in the protections
afforded by apology laws such that two thirds of state apology statutes protect only expressions
of regret, leaving out any admission of fault or responsibility. Yet another issue is that
malpractice lawyers are more inclined to pursue cases where apologies have been made, even if
these statements cannot be used as evidence of malpractice behavior (Gallagher et al., 2007). In
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the end, apology laws may not reassure physicians that it is safe to communicate transparently and that is assuming that physicians are even aware that these laws exist.
Overall, these findings provide mixed support for government involvement in patient
safety initiatives, and furthermore, demonstrate that the legal system can both help and hinder
transparency efforts. One the one hand, apology laws can alleviate some of the hostility in the
medico-legal environment and therefore encourage physicians to communicate more openly with
patients and families. On the other hand, mandatory reporting laws have not stimulated adequate
levels of reporting activity as they fail to recognize that 1) medical errors are largely a private
experience, and 2) that legislating morality and personal behavior is impractical. Another caveat
regarding mandatory reporting systems is that they can thwart patient safety goals by
undermining the physician’s sense of self-determination and rendering the medico-legal climate
more threatening than it already is.
Although patient safety advocates convey optimism for voluntary reporting, it should not
be forgotten that the effectiveness of these systems is hinged upon eradicating the tendencies for
perfectionism and shame-and-blame, so that physicians can find the willingness to report a broad
spectrum of medical errors.
Taken together, these findings suggest that the plan to institutionalize transparency
should consist mainly of grassroots efforts that are geared towards enhancing the quality of
medical education and implementing disclosure programs at the organizational level, all the
while empowering physicians to adopt an attitude of candor in dealing with medical errors.
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Compounded Effects of Individual, Organizational, and Societal Forces
According to the Gestalt perspective, when analyzing and understanding a human system,
the whole is always greater than the sum of its parts. Applying this perspective to the issues of
transparency means considering the compounding effects of the intrapersonal, interpersonal,
institutional, and societal barriers to transparency and error disclosure.
To start with, disclosing medical errors has been documented as an often agonizing and
psychologically painful experience for physicians because it implicates their sense of
professional competence (Banja, 2005). Medical mistakes in general are a great source of
distress for physicians (Christensen, Levinson, & Dunn, 1992; Gallagher & Lucas, 2005;
Newman, 1996) that generate feelings of remorse, guilt, inadequacy, and frustration (Hobgood,
Hevia, Tamayo-Sarver, Weiner, & Riviello, 2005). Although some errors occur out of
negligence and lackadaisical behavior, it is important to acknowledge that most physicians have
pursued medicine with the intention of beneficence - to relieve others’ pain and suffering.
What emerges from this systemic analysis is that medical error conversations cause
physicians to face recriminations from patients, lawyers, hospital-employers, insurance
companies, and their own conscience, along with the threats of incurring legal and financial
penalties. Furthermore, all of this occurs against the backdrop of a medico-legal climate that
does little to make patients more forgiving, lawyers less litigious, and physicians more
communicative; and a medical education system that emphasizes perfection over ethical
behavior. It is therefore not surprising that many physicians develop “medical narcissism” - a
psychological armor of sorts that protects against the continual attacks on the physician’s self-

26

esteem and allows them to cope with their work (Banja, 2005). From a patient safety perspective
however, medical narcissism is antithetical to transparency.
There is little consensus on what constitutes a medical error, and moreover, complex
treatments and procedures create wiggle room for determining adverse outcomes to be nonerroneous in nature. For example, it has been noted that “most physicians are much worse than
judges or juries in distinguishing between honest misjudgments and negligent errors, often
confusing blameworthy deviation with acceptable professional standards and blameless
misfortune” (Kapp, 1997, p.788).
However, in a culture of transparency, it is less important to determine precisely whether
a medical error occurred and whether it was preventable, seeing that physicians would be more
inclined to disclose these events - at least for the sake of learning about them. In the end
however, no single party or entity is to blame: Poor transparency is more accurately portrayed as
a product of the milieu in which physicians learn, practice, and live.

Evidence of Successful Transparency Efforts
Patient safety and transparency initiatives are on the rise. Between 2002 and 2005, the
percentage of institutions that established disclosure policies increased from 36 percent to 68
percent (Gallagher et al., 2006a; Lamb, Studdert, Bohmer, Berwick, & Brennan, 2003) A recent
article in Time Magazine has declared the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Hospitals as
superior health services providers in the US (Waller, 2006). For decades, VA hospitals have
made concerted efforts to improve patient safety. For example, their patient safety information
system, which they nicknamed “SPOT”, combined with their non-punitive approach to
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addressing medical errors, has gained clinicians’ trust and collaboration in a patient safety
initiative, as is evidenced by an enormous increase in annual error incident reports from 257 in
the year 2000 to 74,480 in 2005 (US Department of Veterans Affairs, 2006).
The relationship between effective provider-patient communication and lower
malpractice litigation rates is supported by Levinson, Roter, Mullooly, Dull, and Frankel (1997)
who demonstrated that significant differences between physicians with zero-claim histories and
physicians with existing claim histories are a result of physicians’ communication styles. It was
reported that the physicians in the ‘no claims’ group more often used humor and statements of
orientation, and tended to engage in facilitation techniques where patients’ opinions and
understanding of clinical information could be ascertained. Although these communication
techniques do not pertain to transparency per se, this research provides yet more evidence that
healthy provider-patient communication is associated with a reduced likelihood of malpractice
litigation.
The apology and disclosure program at the University of Michigan Health System
(UMHS) is among the most touted examples of successful transparency efforts in healthcare.
Since the program was implemented in 1999, their abandonment of the deny-and-defend
approach to communicating about adverse outcomes led to significant reductions in malpractice
litigation rates, time needed to resolve litigation, and settlement amounts awarded (Balcerzak &
Leonhardt, 2008; Boothman, Blackwell, Cambell, Commiskey, & Anderson, 2009; Clinton &
Obama, 2006). Specifically, between 2001 and 2005 it was reported that annual litigation costs
dropped from $3 million to $1 million; the average time to resolve claims decreased from 20.7
months to 9.5 months; and the number of claims and lawsuits dropped from 262 to 114.
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Another highly successful program was reported at COPIC, a large medical malpractice
insurance carrier based in Colorado. Their program combined disclosure practices for
anticipated and unanticipated events, combined with early compensation, in order to prevent
injury cases from entering into the legal system altogether (Boothman, Blackwell, Cambell,
Commiskey & Anderson, 2009). According the Hartford Courant (2006)—"payments to
aggrieved patients were under $6,000, compared with about $284,000 for doctors not in the
program."
The Bureau of Veterans Affairs (VA) hospital in Lexington, Kentucky, is an example of
an effective medical error disclosure program that encourages extreme honesty (Kraman &
Hamm, 1999). According to Walling and Ackerman (2006), since the late 1980s, the VA hospital
has been encouraging expressions of sympathy and admissions of fault, and actively seeks to
disclose medical errors by offering their staff the necessary support for filing a claim. As a result
of these concerted efforts, this VA hospital has seen astonishing results as they have reduced
lawsuits and costs associated with settlements and defense fees. In a seventeen year period, only
three cases have gone to trial. In addition to resolving disputes in a less adversarial manner, the
VA’s average settlement cost is now $16,000 per case – a figure which stands in sharp contrast
to the national VA average of $98,000.
Disclosure programs are not limited to alleviating the malpractice crisis. The National
Nosocomial Infection Survey, which is operated by Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
is a voluntary reporting system for hospital-acquired infections. It was shown that nosocomialinfection rates were 32 percent lower in hospitals that implemented the program than in hospitals
without the program (Haley et al., 1985).
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It is not surprising that the apology and disclosure programs discussed herein have
generated considerable attention. This is mainly because leaders in these organizations enacted
programs that apply a relatively simple and straightforward solution (i.e., saying “I’m sorry”) to
rather complex and costly healthcare problems. Moreover, their actions were perceived to be
bold, especially considering that they were guided by the very principle – transparency – that
was historically admonished in the healthcare industry. These organizations are thus considered
exemplary in their efforts to be transparent.

Theoretical Support
The present section will review various organizational change theories in order to
describe, from a theoretical perspective, why transparent communication is not yet normative in
healthcare, despite its known potential to reduce medical errors and malpractice litigation. The
theories discussed in this section will also clarify where the healthcare industry stands in its quest
to establish transparency, and suggest the process that must be undertaken in order to attain
higher levels of transparency.
Descriptive Theory: What’s the Problem?
A consistent yet unfortunate reality about organizational change is that it does not come
easily (Quinn, Spreitzer & Brown, 2000; Strebel, 1996), and this is likely because change
represents the death of the status quo (Bozak, 2003) and the loss of familiar routine (Applebaum
& Wohl, 2000). To illustrate the high failure rate of organizational change efforts, one
researcher found that approximately 75 percent of all total quality management, reengineering,
strategic planning, and downsizing initiatives have either failed or have disrupted the system to a
point where it was seriously jeopardized (Cameron, 1997). It seems that this trend will continue
30

until it is realized that failed organizational change efforts result from failing to successfully alter
the human system (Quinn et al., 2000).For example, one study revealed senior managers’
predominant belief that modifying a company’s structure will transform employee behavior,
although formal structure is the last element that should be addressed in organizational change
efforts (Beer, Eisenstat & Spector, 1990).
Lewin’s (1958) force field analysis theory was an attempt to explain the organizational
change process. According to Lewin, organizational stability is the result of two opposing
energies - known as driving and restraining forces - that constantly push against one another. He
argued that stability is a dynamic rather than a static phenomenon because eventually, a change
in the strength of either of these forces destabilizes the organization, for better or for worse.
When driving forces are strengthened or similarly, when restraining forces are diminished, the
organization moves towards desired change. On the other hand, when restraining forces are
increased, this creates resistance to change thereby causing the organization to maintain the
status quo.
In addition to describing the dynamics of change, Lewin (1958) outlined the stages of
change. The first is the unfreezing stage where cognitive dissonance is experienced which
creates the awareness that change is needed. This is oftentimes a turbulent and chaotic period
seeing that the unfreezing stage involves challenging fundamental beliefs and assumptions. The
unfreezing stage is often hard to overcome because of the natural tendency for humans to seek
safety and predictability, therefore causing them to resist new conditions that might threaten their
established identities. Being “change ready” thus requires the willingness to relinquish
familiarity and control over one’s environment.
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In the second stage, the individual or organization enters the changing process, where
actions are taken and transformation occurs by way of learning something new. The third and
final stage, called refreezing, is when the image and identity of the organization are reified, and
occurs only once the proposed changes have been fully integrated. Depending on the
discrepancy between the organization’s desired and observed outcomes, this process is repeated
until the final results are satisfactory.
In the context of the present study, Lewin’s force field analysis allows one to identify the
driving and restraining forces that explain why the widespread adoption of transparency in
healthcare has been so difficult to achieve. As was discussed earlier, the healthcare system is
confronted with numerous restraining forces, such as perfectionism, a culture of shame and
blame, and a litigious medico-legal environment. Lewin’s theory also highlights that the US
healthcare system has yet to surpass the first change stage. It is quite apparent that the healthcare
culture is still “frozen”, as its modus operandi for dealing with errors is a shame-and-blame and
deny-and-defend approach. Given these antagonistic conditions, it becomes quite clear that a
paradigm shift needs to occur in order for a culture of transparency to prevail.
Prescriptive Theory: What’s the Plan?
Indeed, change theorists have expressed their differences about what constitutes an
effective change method. Chin and Benne (1985) offered a comprehensive classification of
change strategies (in other words, “meta-theory”), and in doing so clarified the predominant
mindset that has guided, though more often misguided, leaders and other change agents. The
categories of change strategies are known as empirical-rational, power-coercive, and normativere-educative.
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According to Chin and Benne (1985), empirical-rational change strategies assume that
individuals are purely rational, and that once rational self-interests are clarified, individuals will
feel compelled to effect certain changes. Therefore, change is about convincing people to see the
wisdom behind the proposed changes so as to earn their commitment and loyalty to the process.
Moreover, the empirical-rational strategy assumes that change occurs by way of transferring
expert-level information in a one-way, top-down fashion (Miles, Thangaraj, Dawei, & Huiqin,
2002). Initially, effecting change through rational appeals is highly attractive because the
method is simple: Accurate information and persuasive communication are the only tools
required. But as Chin and Benne point out, using it as a single change strategy can be
problematic, especially in cases where the group of change targets displays deep resistance
towards the change.
What this suggests is that other forms of cognitions such as attitudes, values, and norms,
also play a role in the change process and therefore need to be addressed. Furthermore, one-way
communication might be inadequate, especially when the proposed changes are deep-seated.
The implication for establishing transparency is that providing physicians with logical reasons as
to why they should communicate transparently (e.g. outlining the connection between apologies
and reduced litigation rates) might be necessary for them to understand why transparency is
important; but insufficient as far as motivating them to communicate transparently. For these
reasons, the empirical-rational strategy is unlikely to lead the healthcare industry into a culture of
transparency.
Chin and Benne (1985) also discuss power-coercive strategies as comprising change
efforts that rely heavily on punishment. The idea is that members of a system should listen to
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those who hold power, even if members feel that the proposed changes are inappropriate (Miles
et al., 2002). At times, change agents draw upon moral power, which involves playing with
sentiments such as shame and guilt. Although the power-coercive strategy takes into account the
role of emotions and therefore might seem more sophisticated than the empirical-rational
approach, power-coercive strategies attempt to stimulate change through coercion.
According to Yukl (1994), the use of coercion is likely to yield disappointing results:
Either those being threatened will superficially comply by going along with the request with
apathy and minimal effort, or they will resist the request altogether. Furthermore, what is
unlikely to result is true commitment, whereby change targets internally agree with a request and
do everything in their power to carry it out effectively. Thus, the healthcare culture of shame
and blame which has failed to reduce medical errors and improve patient safety (Berwick, 2001;
Horns & Loper, 2002; Krizek, 2000; Sibbald, 2001) is a prime example of the ineffectiveness of
the power-coercive approach.
Chin and Benne’s (1985) normative re-educative approach seems to be the most
promising of all change strategies. This strategy is similar to the empirical-rational approach in
that it takes into account the importance of knowledge; however it assumes that knowledge is
social rather than rational by considering that values, attitudes, norms, and institutionalized
relationships – in other words, the components of a culture - must be modified in order to
achieve successful organizational change.
Miles and colleagues (2002) outline five assumptions in this strategy. First,
organizational change needs to occur within the system (i.e. at the individual level), and between
the system and its external environment. Second, change requires involvement and participation
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from individual members (i.e. grassroots change efforts). Third, change agents should replace
power dominance and one-way communication patterns with mutual collaboration and two-way
communication. Fourth, deeper level assumptions such as attitudes and values must be
challenged. And finally, the change process should enhance personal growth, as this will
empower the system to direct itself towards change in the future.
The normative re-educative strategy has numerous implications for the establishment of
transparency in healthcare. First, it tells us that transparency efforts require an examination of
individual factors in conjunction with an understanding of the broader context in which
physicians operate. Second, establishing transparency requires two-way communication
between physicians and patient safety advocates. The third point is that fundamental structures
such as attitudes, values, norms, and institutional relationships must be addressed to establish a
transparent culture. In other words, healthcare is in need of a complete cultural overhaul (Garbutt
et al., 2007; Jeffe et al., 2004; Leape, 1994; Leape & Berwick, 2005; Leape et al., 1998; Nance,
2008). And lastly, transparency efforts should be accompanied by the sub-goal of enhancing the
personal growth and development of physicians. It is believed that satisfying these conditions
will allow leaders to unfreeze the healthcare culture, at least as a first step towards establishing a
culture of transparency.
In the context of this research, Chin and Benne’s normative re-educative strategy will be
applied to measure physicians’ propensities to communicate transparently, in spite of the
multitude of barriers they encounter. Hence, actual change is not what is being measured in this
research; rather, this research will inform us about physicians’ readiness and willingness to
communicate transparently.
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Empirical support for the normative re-educative strategy is scant, especially as it relates
to research in healthcare settings. To date, several authors have expressed the belief that this
strategy offers a promising way to achieve fundamental change in healthcare. (Biley & Whale,
1996; McPhail, 1997; Soumerai & Avorn, 1984). Empirical support for the viability of the
normative re-educative approach is provided by Edmond (1999), who demonstrated successful
implementation of integrated care pathways in a nursing unit using the normative re-educative
strategy, thereby supporting two of Chin and Benne’s (1985) five assumptions: Targeting change
at the individual level, and applying a participatory approach.
Other researchers have compared the effectiveness of the normative-re-educative versus
the empirical-rational strategy by assessing the impact of two change tactics on hospital infection
rates. Their results showed that the normative re-educative strategy led to a statistically
significant decrease in infection rates, whereas no significant difference was noted in the
empirical-rational condition (Reilly, McIntosh, & Currie, 2002). However, their research only
tested the normative re-educative strategy’s assumption about adopting a participatory approach
to change.
Lastly, Barach and Small’s (2000) study on near-miss reporting systems in various
industries supported the importance of addressing factors representing multiple domains in
attempting to stimulate change. Specifically, they found that individual, organizational, and
societal influences could incentivize or prevent error reporting activities.
Overall, the normative re-educative model is only partially supported. In light of this, the
present study sets out to generate additional support for the model as it applies to healthcare.
Specifically, this research will test the assumptions attitudes, norms, and institutional
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relationships are important components of organizational change, and that addressing individual
and contextual factors is indispensable to the change process.

Chapter Summary
Multiple factors explain why healthcare is characterized by poor transparency practices.
At the intrapersonal level, factors include a medical education curriculum that offers little
training moral and interpersonal skills, and a medical education setting where belittlement,
humiliation, and the pursuit for perfectionism are make up the “hidden curriculum. At the
interpersonal and institutional levels, factors include a professional or organizational culture that
uses shame-and-blame and deny-and-defend strategies in the face of medical errors and bad
outcomes. At the societal level factors include features in the medico-legal climate such has
hostile and litigious patients, as well as transparency legislation whose effectiveness is
questionable. Lewin’s force field analysis is used to describe the issue of poor transparency in
healthcare. Chin and Benne’s normative re-educative strategy provides theoretical support that
change efforts should address factors representing multiple domains and should also consider the
effects of norms, attitudes, values, and relationships.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses
Three exogenous variables in this study represent varying dimensions of the context
studied. Looking at the constructs in Figure 1, perfectionism represents the intrapersonal
domain; socio-organizational climate represents the interpersonal and institutional domain; and
medico-legal environment represents the societal domain. However, it should be noted that this
study is based on physicians’ perceptions of their perfectionist tendencies, socio-organizational
climate, and medico-legal environment. Therefore, the unit of analysis is limited to the
physician.
The purpose of this research is not to blame physicians for not being transparent enough.
Rather, this research assumes that the lack of transparency is a product of the environment in
which physicians operate. Thus, the systemic nature of this problem justifies a holistic analysis.
Support for a holistic framework is found in Chin and Benne’s (1985) normative re-educative
strategy which assumes that change requires a consideration of individual and contextual factors.
The normative re-educative strategy also supports the use of perfectionism and socioorganizational climate as predictor variables as it assumes that attitudes, values, norms, and
institutional relationships must be redefined in order to successfully change an organization.
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Figure 1. Psychosocial Determinants of Transparency: A Normative Re-Educative Approach
The Relationship between Perfectionism and Transparency
Perfectionism is based on the fundamental belief that perfection is achievable and that is
anything less than perfect is unacceptable. Perfectionism can be a maladaptive trait which
causes individuals to feel a chronic sense of failure and shame (Burns, 1980; Hamachek, 1978;
Hollender, 1965; Pacht, 1984). It has also been suggested that perfectionism is a multifaceted
construct, and as such, perfectionism has taken on a variety of meanings (Flett & Hewitt, 2002).
Thus, perfectionism in this study is broken down into several indicators so as to identify the
various thought patterns which are posited to interfere with transparent communication.

The first perfectionism indicator in this study is called self-imposed perfectionism and
refers to self-generated professional expectations that are unrealistically high (Frost, Marten,
Lahart, & Rosenblate, 1990). Gabbard’s (1985) case studies reveal the tendency for physicians
to have an exaggerated sense of responsibility for matters beyond their control, a chronic sense
that they are not doing enough, and not surprisingly, a difficulty in relaxing and a reluctance to
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take vacations. It is believed that physicians’ reluctance to freely admit errors not only
exacerbates the distress associated with making a mistake (Christensen, Levinson, & Dunn,
1992; Newman, 1996); perfectionism also leads to other maladaptive behaviors, such as blaming
others, which in turn add inhibits the establishment of an error-transparent culture.
The second indicator is called other-imposed perfectionism and refers to the standards
imposed on the physician by patients and the healthcare profession. This indicator is similar to
Flett and Hewitt’s (2002) concept of socially prescribed perfectionism which relates to the
standards imposed on the individual by society. Hilfiker (1984) argues that physicians are illprepared to deal with medical errors because nothing in their training prepares them to
communicate in this manner. Along the same lines, Dubovsky and Schrier (1983) suggest that the
infallibility illusion is cultivated in medical school where trainees develop an obsession for
perfection that later follows them into their practice. The widely held assumption among
trainees that physicians are not as fallible as the average human being (Dubovsky & Schrier,
1983) is a testament to their pursuit for perfection.

Flett and Hewitt (2002) further suggest that perfectionists often redirect their perfectionist
tendencies outwards by holding others to unrealistically high standards, hence the third indicator
is called other-directed perfectionism. A prime of example of how physicians sometimes project
perfectionism onto others is offered by Dubovsky and Schrier (1983) who explain the origins of
the perfectionist mindset in medicine. They suggest that senior physicians who are unable to
accept their own limitations (i.e. they are themselves perfectionists) tend to be overly critical and
controlling of their subordinate trainees, out of a fear that trainees’ weaknesses will bring to light
their own.
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The fourth indicator is called image and refers to the tendency for perfectionists to feel
highly self-conscious and to make every effort to ensure that their shortcomings are not visible to
others (Frost et al., 1995). Several researchers have reported the physicians’ reluctance to
discuss errors, even in informal settings (Christensen, Levinson, & Dunn, 1992; Newman, 2006).
Christensen and colleagues (1992) reported the beliefs of one physician who disclosed his strong
expectations of being ridiculed by his colleagues about his mistakes. His precise words were “I
can get crucified if I screw up” (p. 427). This particular physician was even afraid to disclose
errors to his spouse. Similarly, Kaldjian and colleagues (2006) found that the fear of looking
foolish in front of junior colleagues and trainees is an impediment to error disclosure.

Kaldjian, Jones, Rosenthal, Tripp-Reimer, and Hillis (2006) found that perpetuating
perfectionism is an attitudinal barrier to error disclosure, and that the willingness to accept one’s
fallibility facilitates error disclosure. One of the problems with perfectionism is that it inevitably
leads to feelings of shame: Given that the perfectionist internalizes unrealistically high
expectations, they eventually fall short of their standards (Flett & Hewitt, 2002). The
perfectionist is then motivated to rid themselves of their shamefulness by engaging in
maladaptive behaviors. Hewitt and Flett (1991) have shown that some perfectionist traits particularly those that concern having unrealistically high expectations of others - are
significantly correlated with blaming others. One might therefore posit that avoiding
responsibility for one’s own actions is a convenient way out of experiencing shame. In addition
to setting themselves up for eventual “failure” (i.e. because unachievable standards are
internalized), perfectionists are also highly concerned about their image and therefore are more
likely to conceal their mistakes. Thus, it becomes apparent that the stronger the physician’s

41

perfectionist attitude, the less transparent they are likely to be. In light of these findings, the
following hypotheses are derived:

Considering the research on perfectionism and transparency, the following hypotheses
are generated:
H1: As physician perfectionism scores increase, medical error transparency and provider
patient transparency scores will decrease
The Relationship between Socio-Organizational Climate and Transparency
Substantial research has highlighted the importance of increasing socio-organizational
support in order to achieve transparency. For instance, Edmonson (2004) found that error
detection is influenced by organizational characteristics. A review of the literature suggests that
several factors in the healthcare socio-organizational climate may encourage or inhibit
physicians from communicating transparently. As such, five indicators have been identified for
this construct.
The first indicator, called immunity, refers to the characteristics of the healthcare
organization’s reporting system. Research predominantly supports the use of voluntary,
confidential, non-punitive reporting systems in order to elicit higher reporting rates (Weissman et
al., 2005). It has also been shown that punitive disciplinary systems are detrimental to patient
safety efforts because they increase physicians’ reluctance to step forward and disclose errors
(Greely, 1991; Vincent & Coulter, 2002).In a similar vein, it was argued earlier that mandatory
error reporting systems are ineffective because they emphasize punishment over error correction
(Cohen, 2000). Voluntary systems that protect those who disclose errors and that are nonpunitive tend to yield greater amounts of process information that is essential to preventing
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medical errors (Barach & Small, 2000).It has been widely reported that fears of reprisal; loss of
reputation, position, or advancement; fears of negative publicity; believing error reporting
systems penalize those who are honest; and lacking of confidentiality and immunity after
disclosure inhibit error reporting (Jeffe et al., 2004; Kaldjian et al., 2006; Leape, 2002).
The second indicator is called peer competition which measures the degree to which
competitiveness characterizes the work atmosphere and relationships among healthcare coworkers. Some have argued that the fear of loss of respect from peers is a barrier to error
reporting (Wu et al., 1997) and that competition with peers inhibits error disclosure (Kaldjian et
al., 2006).
The third indicator, called moral support, refers to whether physicians are emotionally
supported by their institution in the after their involvement in a bad clinical outcome. The
relationship between the availability of emotional support and transparent communication has
been well-established (Christensen, et al., 1992; Jeffe et al., 2004). Kaldjian and colleagues
(2006) demonstrated that one impediment to error disclosure is lacking institutional and collegial
support after disclosure, such as a professional forum to discuss errors. In a later study, Kaldjian
and colleagues (2008) reported that an atmosphere of forgiveness may increase error disclosure
rates among physicians. As was discussed earlier, a culture of shame and blame prevents
physicians from admitting their mistakes. Physicians are in need of empathy and forgiveness in
order to overcome the negative feelings that accompany bad outcomes (Dobovsky & Schrier,
1983). Also, it has been extensively argued that physicians seek social support, validation, and
re-affirmation from their peers in order to mitigate the emotional impact of having committed an
error (Christensen et al., 1992; Goldberg et al., 1991; Newman, 1996).
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The fourth indicator is called policy support which relates to organizational policies and
procedures that encourage error reporting and disclosure. Jeffe and colleagues (2004) found that
physicians’ lack of knowledge on how and what to report was a significant barrier to error
reporting, and that clear reporting guidelines would facilitate transparent communication.
Kaldjian and colleagues (2006) identified uncertainty about how to disclose errors and
uncertainty about what errors to disclose as two factors that impede transparency. In a later
study, Kaldjian and colleagues (2008) surveyed physicians about the likelihood of reporting
hypothetical errors, past instances of reporting behaviors, and attitudes about error reporting.
They found a gap between physicians’ intentions and actual behaviors such that most
respondents had intentions to report certain errors, but few had actually reported them in the past.
They explained this gap with their finding that 62.3 percent of faculty physicians lacked
knowledge on how to report errors. Thus it seems that even when physicians are willing to report
errors, the lack of institutional support presents itself as a barrier to transparency.
The fifth indicator is called perfectionist norms. The moral imperative embedded in the
Hippocratic Oath, “first, do no harm”, may have produced unintended consequences. Although
it is meant to remind physicians to refrain from increasing another’s suffering, it also places an
enormous burden on their shoulders by leading them to believe that error is altogether forbidden
(Leape, 1994; Newman, 1996). The irony is thus that the moral imperative, which was promoted
to ensure healthcare quality, may in the end compromise healthcare quality by making physicians
weary of errors to a point where they are afraid to discuss them. What this suggests is that the
moral imperative should be followed by a new norm, stating “second, once you have harmed,
report, disclose, and learn”.
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Leape (1994) argues that physicians are taught to strive for an error-free practice. Role
models in medicine socialize their students to adopt perfection as their professional standard.
Moreover, blame is commonly used to encourage ideal performance among physician trainees.
As a result, medicine has created the “perfectibility model” which maintains that proper training
and motivation (e.g., punishment) will prevent physicians from ever making mistakes (Leape,
1994). Thus, it is hard to imagine that physicians – many of whom are trained to uphold the
infallibility illusion – would be receptive to the idea of communicating transparently about bad
outcomes. Along the same lines, Newman (1996) suggested that to admit imperfection in
healthcare is socially unacceptable.
In light of these findings, the following two hypotheses are generated:
H2: As physicians’ perceptions of socio-organizational barriers increase, medical error
transparency and provider patient transparency scores will decrease
Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behavior (TPB) was developed to measure the
discrepancy between attitudes and behaviors. The TPB postulate that attitudes, norms, and
perceived behavioral controls are related to intentions, and that intentions are in turn related to
behaviors. An earlier version of the theory operated on the assumption that behaviors are
voluntary, in other words, within the individual’s control (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Thus, the
TPB was modified such that perceptions of behavioral controls are assumed to mediate the
relationship between attitudes, norms, intentions, and behaviors. The TPB also predicts that
behavior is directly affected by perceived behavioral control, whereas behavior is only indirectly
influenced by norms and attitudes. The diagram in Figure 2 illustrates the conceptual model put
forth by Ajzen in the TPB.
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Figure 2. Ajzen’s Conceptual Framework for the Theory of Planned Behavior
In the context of this research, policy and immunity can be considered measures of
perceived behavioral control. The items in the PTQ that pertain to this indicator ask about the
physician’s awareness of clear guidelines for reporting and disclosing errors, and whether the
organization encourages error reporting and disclosure. Jeffe and colleagues’ (2004) finding that
physicians lack knowledge on how to report errors, as well as Kaldjian and colleagues’ (2008)
finding about the discrepancy between physicians’ intentions to report and their actual reporting
behaviors, collectively suggest that policies might be better predictors of transparency compared
to norms, immunity, peer competition, and moral support. In light of this, the following
hypothesis is generated:
H2c: Policy and immunity will yield stronger causal relationships with transparency compared to
norms, peer competition, and moral support.
The Relationship between Medico-Legal Environment and Transparency
This construct refers to factors in the medico-legal environment that inhibit transparency.
The first indicator, called legislative protection, measures physicians’ understanding of
malpractice law and the degree to which they feel protected by it. As Kapp (1997) points out,
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although physicians’ apprehension about medical malpractice is understandable, their reluctance
to communicate transparently is based on a faulty understanding of the law. Rather, it is widely
accepted that the tendency to conceal medical errors is counterproductive and does not constitute
sound risk management strategy (Kavaler & Speigel, 2003; Hickson et al., 1992; Levinson et al.,
1997; Vincent et al., 1994; Wu et al., 1997).
The second indicator, called patient litigiousness, refers to physicians’ perceptions about
patients’ inclinations to seek legal retribution against their provider. The importance of this
indicator is captured by research which suggests that the US legal climate is far more litigious
than the legal climate in Canada (Coyte, Dewees, & Trebilcock, 1991; Picard & Robertson,
1996), which in turn inhibits the emergence of a culture of full disclosure (Baginski, Hassell, &
Kimbrough, 2001).
The second indicator is called malpractice risks and refers to the perceived fears and risks
associated with malpractice litigation. It has been widely reported that fearing legal liability
prevents error disclosure in healthcare (Gallagher & Lucas, 2005; Gallagher, Waterman, Ebers,
Fraser, & Levinson, 2003; Goldberg et al., 2002; Kaldjian et al., 2006; Leape, 2005).
Given the research about legal barriers and transparency, the following two hypotheses
are generated:
H3: As physicians’ perceptions of legal barriers increase, provider-patient transparency
and error reporting transparency scores will decrease
Error Reporting Transparency
This construct measures physicians’ responses to errors that vary in the severity of harm
inflicted on the patient. The error definitions are largely based on the National Coordinating
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Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention (NCC MERP) index for categorizing
medication errors. The medical errors investigated in this research include no harm errors which
are errors that had the potential to harm but did not, minor harm errors which are errors that
cause an injury that is easily treated and has no lasting effects, hospitalization errors which are
errors that cause admission to a hospital or prolonged hospital stay, and life-saving intervention
errors which are errors that require life-saving interventions but do not result in death.
Questions about errors causing death were excluded from the PTQ. In order for the PTQ
to reliably measure transparency, limiting the questions about transparency to no harm and minor
harm, and serious harm errors is more likely to elicit honest responses from physicians. Although
no harm and minor harm errors do not result in serious consequences, they are considered an
invaluable source of error information (Kaldjian et al., 2008). Less serious errors also occur
more frequently, which allows for greater quantitative analyses (Barach & Small, 2000; IOM,
2000) and a greater understanding about systematic flaws.
Four indicators have been devised to measure this construct: No harm questions ask
about reporting behaviors for errors that have not led to injury. Minor harm questions ask about
reporting behaviors for errors that have resulted in injury that is easily treated and has no lasting
effects. Given that no harm and minor harm errors are commonplace (IOM, 2000), the
assumption is made that the physician has, at some point, committed these types of errors.
Hospitalization asks about reporting behaviors for errors that caused admission to the
hospital or prolonged patient stay. Life-saving asks about reporting behaviors for errors that
required life-saving interventions and did not result in death. There is no assumption that the
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physician committed this type of error as the question only asks about the physician’s modus
operandi.
Provider-Patient Transparency
This construct concerns the relationship between the provider and the patient, and more
specifically, measures physicians’ propensities to communicate transparently about preventable
and non-preventable medical errors. A review of the literature suggests that apologies,
expressions of sympathy and regret, and disclosing all details about bad outcomes are associated
with increased honesty in the physician-patient relationship and accordingly, reduced
malpractice litigation rates (Cohen, 2004; Liebman & Hyman, 2004; Wojcieszak, 2007).
This construct includes three indicators: Apology, which refers to physicians’ propensities
to apologize to patients and families for preventable errors; sympathy, which refers to physicians’
propensities to express sympathy or regret to patients and families for a bad outcome; and
honesty, which refers to physicians’ propensities to disclose the details of bad outcomes to
patients and families.
The Effect of Transparency Practices on Physicians’ Propensities to Report and Disclose Errors
In general, error reporting activities are more complicated and involve more practical
barriers compared to provider-patient transparency. Specifically, expressing sympathy for a bad
outcome and disclosing the details surrounding bad outcomes are more straightforward processes
compared to formal error reporting, as they do not entail filling out paperwork, notifying a
reporting agency, or even determining whether an adverse outcome was a mistake or a natural
consequence of the illness. Therefore, this study will also determine whether there are
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significant differences in the propensity for transparency between error reporting transparency
and provider patient transparency.
H4a: The mean score for error reporting transparency will differ significantly from the
mean score for provider patient transparency.
It is also informative to consider whether different types of errors are associated with
different propensities for transparency. When the IOM released its landmark report about
medical errors in 1999, a comment was made that less serious errors are more likely to be
reported, given that they produce less guilt than serious errors. However, little is known about
physicians’ tendencies to report different types of medical errors. One problem with reporting
no harm and minor harm errors is that they are less noticeable than serious errors. The
assumption that less serious errors are often privately experienced means that physicians are less
publicly accountable for them. Also, the fact that JCAHO focuses so intently on sentinel events
may inadvertently reinforce the idea that less serious errors do not have to be reported. .
It is also useful to determine whether certain provider-patient transparency behaviors are
practiced more often than others, as doing so may inform risk managers about the aspects of
provider-patient communication that need to be addressed. As discussed earlier, much scholarly
literature and research has concluded that provider patient transparency is a means to reduce
malpractice litigation. However, little is known about how physicians go about disclosure with
patients and families. Therefore, this study will determine whether there are significant
differences between physicians’ tendencies to apologize for preventable errors, express
sympathy for bad outcomes, and communicate honestly about the details surrounding bad
outcomes. In light of this, the following 2 hypotheses are generated:

50

H4b: The mean scores for no harm, minor harm, hospital, and life threatening errors will
be significantly different from each other.
H4c: The mean scores for apology, sympathy, and honesty will be significantly different
from each other.

Method
Sampling
Non-random purposive sampling was used to obtain a cross-sectional sample of
physicians who were drawn from a multi-site healthcare system located in Central Florida. The
researcher met with physicians at regularly scheduled board meetings to distribute the survey.
The survey was also distributed electronically via email. Participation in this study was
voluntary. The sampling frame included roughly 2000 physicians.
Measures, Instrumentation, and Scoring
The PTQ is a 37-item behavioral and attitudinal screening paper-and-pencil questionnaire
that asks physicians about 5 attributes: Perfectionism, socio-organizational climate, medicolegal environment, provider-patient transparency, and medical error transparency. Considering
that no known instruments measure the variables delineated in this study, the items in the PTQ
were based on a literature review of factors that are known to interfere or encourage transparent
communication in healthcare. Given the novelty of this instrument, it was piloted on a sample of
30 physicians and subsequently evaluated in terms of reliability and validity. Please see
Appendix D for a copy of the PTQ.
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All items except for demographic questions use a five-point Likert scale, where 1 refers
to “strongly agree”, 2 refers to “agree”, 3 refers to “mixed feelings”, 4 refers to “disagree”, and 5
refers to “strongly disagree”.
Given that no harm and minor harm errors are commonplace (IOM, 2000), the
assumption is made that the physician has, at some point, committed these types of errors.
Therefore, the PTQ asks different questions for no harm and minor harm errors versus
hospitalization and life-threatening errors.
Although all four indicators were associated with the question “In the event of a medical
error that (severity of harm), my routine practice is to report the error to…”, the no harm and
minor harm errors were also associated with the question “There are past instances of medical
errors which resulted in (severity of harm) which I did not report”. This question was not posed
with regard to hospitalization and life-threatening errors. Because these types of errors occur
less often and thus do not describe the experience of every physician, presenting physicians with
this statement would have produced misleading results. For example, if a physician-respondent
never committed an error that resulted in a life-saving intervention, and subsequently disagreed
with the statement “There are past instances of medical errors which resulted in (severity of
harm) that I did not report”, then that response could be interpreted in two ways: 1) the physician
is transparent, or 2) the physician never encountered this type of error.
With respect to the items measuring provider-patient transparency, the assumption was
made that the physician experienced bad outcomes and preventable errors. Therefore, questions
about honest communication and sympathetic statements include statements that read: “There are
past instances of bad outcomes for which I did not provide complete explanations to patients and
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families”, and “there are past instances of bad outcomes for which I did not express sympathy to
patients and families”. Considering that a bad outcome includes preventable and non-preventable
errors, offering detailed explanations and expressions of sympathy are most appropriate under
these circumstances. With respect to apologetic statements, the items referred specifically to
preventable medical errors rather than bad outcomes. Considering that apologies are, among
other things, an admission of responsibility, they are considered more appropriate in situations
where the error was avoidable.
Procedure
Design
A correlational research design was used to determine the degree of relationships
between three exogenous and two endogenous variables.
Variables
Perfectionism
Participants were asked about their perfectionist beliefs and thought patterns. This
construct included four indicators: self-imposed (items 7 and 18), other-imposed (items 1 and
14), other-directed (items 26 and 33), and image (3, 10, and 23).
Socio-Organizational Climate
Participants were asked about their perceptions of formal and informal organizational
support. This construct includes four indicators: Immunity (2, 13, 16, and 31), peer competition
(item 35), moral support (item 21), norms (item 29), and policy support (items 6, 9, 24, and 27).
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Medico-Legal Environment
Participants were asked to evaluate the degree of hostility in the medico-legal
environment. This construct includes 3 indicators: Legislative protection (4), patient
litigiousness (items 20 and 36), and malpractice risk (items 12 and 34).
Provider-Patient Transparency
Participants were asked about their tendencies to communicate transparently with patients
and families regarding preventable and non-preventable medical errors. This construct includes
three indicators: Apology (items 8 and 22), sympathy (items 15 and 30), and honesty (items 5
and 17).
Error Reporting Transparency
Participants were asked about their tendencies to formally report generic categories of
errors that vary in the severity of harm. This construct includes five indicators: No harm (items
19 and 28), minor harm (items 11 and 25), hospitalization (item 32), and life-saving (item 37).
Demographics
The PTQ collected data on occupation (e.g., resident, staff), medical specialty area, years
of experience, proportion of time spent on direct patient care, age, marital status, ethnicity, and
gender. These demographics will serve as control variables to determine whether they can be
considered alternative explanations for transparent behavior.
Statistical Analyses
SPSS will be used to conduct descriptive analyses, including identifying missing data and
outliers, examining the demographic characteristics of respondents, testing the instrument’s
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reliability with Cronbach’s alpha, and performing group means comparisons tests. AMOS
(version 18) will be used to assess construct validity and to conduct various structural equation
modeling (SEM) analyses which use the maximum likelihood method to test for model fit.
According to Wan (2002), SEM involves two critical steps: First, measurement models for latent
constructs must be validated; and second, the overall model (i.e. one that includes all
measurement models) must be fitted. This research will conduct factor analysis to satisfy the
first stage, followed by covariance structure modeling for the second stage.
SEM is an extension of multiple regression analysis. One advantage in using SEM is that
it allows the use of latent construct which are comprised of several observed indicators, which is
furthermore very well suited for survey research in the social sciences. SEM separates error
variance from meaningful variance among the measures (Newcomb, 1990). Controlling for error
in this way allows for a more accurate estimate of the effects of the exogenous/predictor
variables on the endogenous/outcome variables as well as a more accurate assessment of test
reliability. The creation of measurement models specifies relationships between the observed
indicators and their latent constructs, and is tested using confirmatory factor analysis. Another
advantage to using SEM is that it allows for the exploration of the causal relationships among
latent exogenous and endogenous variables; SEM is the only statistical technique that can handle
this sort of analysis (Byrne, 2001). Moreover, it is especially useful in this study given that all
variables are latent and that the exogenous variables are expected to co-vary.
Measurement Models and Evaluation
In the social sciences, the use of latent, ambiguous constructs is commonplace. In order
to overcome some of this ambiguity, indicators are developed so as to provide operational
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definitions that allow the construct to be measured. Therefore, measurement models, such as
those depicted in Figures 3 through 7, are developed to determine the associations between the
indicators and their latent construct(s). To achieve this goal, the measurement models depicted
herein shall undergo factor analysis, a correlational technique that determines meaningful
clusters of shared variance by eliminating redundant and/or unimportant interrelationships,
thereby producing a more parsimonious model.
In the next step, CFA tests the relationship between observed data and the latent
constructs. CFA first validates constructs individually, and then validates clusters of constructs
(which are either endogenous or exogenous, but not both) to determine if any relationships
between constructs exist. During this process, redundant, meaningless, or unimportant
relationships are eliminated, hence reducing the number of parameters to be estimated which
consequently increases power in any future analyses. More specifically, the model is revised by
looking at the factor loadings among indicators and variables. High factor loadings (r ≥.80)
among indicators usually justify the elimination of indicators, whereas high factor loadings
among variables usually justify variable consolidation which occurs by combining indicators for
several variables into a single variable. Indicators with small factor loadings are usually removed
from the model. Lastly, error terms may be correlated, although this should be executed with
caution so as to avoid making the model overly complex. CFA concludes when comparative
statistics convey the degree of “fit” between the conceptual model and the observed data set and
allow the researcher select either the generic or the revised model. Once the researcher has
selected the best model, equality constraints are then imposed on the model to test the degree to
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which the model is appropriate for various physician subgroups. The subgroups will be derived
from the demographic items in the PTQ.

Figure 3. Measurement Model for Perfectionism

Figure 4. Measurement Model for Socio-Organizational Climate
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Figure 5. Measurement Model for Medico-Legal Environment

Figure 6. Measurement Model for Error Reporting Transparency

Figure 7. Measurement Model for Provider-Patient Transparency
Model Specification and Evaluation
Covariance structure modeling is a technique that determines whether the relationships
between the exogenous and endogenous variables are statistically significant (α = .05). The
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covariance structure model presented in Figure 7 depicts the relationship between the two
endogenous and three exogenous variables and was derived from prior research. It is expected
that socio-organizational climate and medico-legal environment will be positively related to both
transparency outcomes, whereas perfectionism will be negatively related to the transparency
outcomes. Causal specifications that are not significant will be removed from the model.
Evaluation of the model will be judged on the basis of (a) the appropriateness of the
direction, strength, and significance of parameter estimates; (b) the convergence of parameter
estimates with the chi-square goodness of fit test (χ2), goodness of fit index (GFI; Bollen, 1989),
adjusted GFI (AGFI; Bollen, 1989), normed fit index (NFI; Bentler& Bonnet, 1980), Tucker
Lewis Index (TLI; Tucker & Lewis, 1973), and the root mean squared error of approximation
(RMSEA; Steiger, 1990); (c) a comparison of the constrained model with its unconstrained
counterpart using the chi-square difference test; and (d) the model’s ability to explain the
variance (R2) of both transparency outcomes.
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Figure 8. Covariance Structure Matrix for Predictors of Transparency
Multiple Group Analysis
To ensure the generalizability of the covariance structure model, multiple group analysis
will be conducted to determine whether the model fits across physician gender, occupation (staff
versus resident physician), and medical specialty. As is summarized below, research suggests
that these three characteristics may be related to transparency.
Research shows that women are more adept at relationship building (Lane & Crane,
2002), which might cause them to communicate transparently with greater ease. When we
consider the finding that men are significantly more likely to be involved in a malpractice claim
compared to women (Abott, 2003; Taragin, Wilczek, Karns, Trout, & Carson, 1992), a question
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arises as to whether women are more likely to engage in provider-patient transparency compared
to men.
Several studies show that medical specialty and occupational status may influence
transparency behaviors. First, some areas of medical practice (e.g. surgical specialties) involve
higher risk procedures compared to other specialties which may in turn influence propensities for
error reporting. Gallagher and colleagues (2006b) suggested that surgeons are more accustomed
to discussing adverse outcomes with patients and families (i.e. during the informed consent
process), and amongst themselves (i.e. during morbidity and mortality conferences) compared to
medical specialists. Garbutt and colleagues (2007) suggested that pediatricians face a unique
challenge when it comes to provider-patient transparency because they have to deal with the
presence of a third party, namely, the child’s primary caregiver.
Control Variables
Age and leadership responsibilities will be controlled for in the covariance structure
model. Research has demonstrated the influence of physician experience on transparency. Sweet
and Bernat (1997) reported that attending physicians are significantly more likely to agree with
the statement that “physicians should tell patients the truth” compared to medical residents.
Other research finds that older professionals are more likely to be concerned with malpractice
litigation, blame from colleagues, professional discipline, and loss of reputation (Kaldjian et al.,
2007), which suggests that age can inhibit transparency.
It is reasonable to suggest that a physician’s leadership status can enhance the propensity
for transparency, as leaders in general are expected to be role models for desirable behavior. It is
also plausible to think that physician leaders stand more to lose in terms or reputation, which in
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turn might inhibit transparency practices. In this study, leadership status is measured by the
percentage of time spent on direct patient care; as such, the less time spent with patients, the
greater the leadership responsibilities.
Group Mean Comparisons
In order to compare differences in the propensities for error reporting versus providerpatient transparency, a paired t-test will be conducted to compare mean scores for each set of
responses. Subsequently, two repeated measures analysis of variance tests will determine
whether there are significant differences in the propensities for transparency among the various
error reporting practices (no harm, minor harm, hospitalization, life-threatening) and providerpatient transparency practices (apology, sympathy, honesty).
Sample Size and Power Analysis
Sample size is an important determinant of conclusion validity, especially when using
SEM where statistical tests are quite sensitive to sample size (Weston & Gore, 2006). The
concern is that when the sample is too small, it decreases confidence in causal inferences and
moreover inhibits the extent to which the results can be generalized to the population of interest,
which in this case corresponds to physicians. A justification of sample size is achieved through
power analysis. Although SEM requires a minimum sample size of 200, a more accurate way to
determine the appropriate sample size is to start by calculating the number of parameters or
causal specifications to be estimated. Next, it is recommended that this number be multiplied by
at least 5, although a larger multiplier is preferable. Given that there are 48 parameters to be
estimated in this study, a minimum sample size of 240 is required.
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Ethical Issues
The potential for risk in this study is minimal. Some questions ask respondents to answer
whether they have reported medical errors or apologized to patients for bad outcomes. Should
this cause any discomfort, it is expected to be short-lived (i.e. for the duration of survey
completion).
After approval by the institutional review boards at participating institutions, the PTQ
will be distributed at medical staff meetings. No personal identifying information will be
collected. Moreover, participants will be assured that their data will remain anonymous.

Chapter Summary
The lack of transparency in healthcare is a systematic and pervasive problem. To reflect
this reality, variables representing intrapersonal, interpersonal, institutional, and societal domains
will be investigated: Perfectionism, socio-organizational climate, and medico-legal environment.
Transparency consists of two factors, namely, error reporting transparency and provider-patient
transparency. The PTQ contains 37 items that inquire about these 5 factors. Non-random
samples of physicians will be drawn from a multi-site healthcare organization in Central Florida.
A correlational design will be used to determine the relationships between perfectionism, socioorganizational climate, medico-legal environment, error reporting transparency and providerpatient transparency. SPSS will be used to perform descriptive analyses and Cronbach’s
reliability test. AMOS will be used to perform confirmatory factor analysis and covariance
structure modeling. The main limitation in this study is that social desirability may prompt
physicians to exaggerate their transparency scores. This study does not pose significant ethical
research problems.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS
Feasibility and Internal Consistency
The pilot study was conducted on 30 physicians at a hospital in the Central Florida
region. The PTQ was administered at the start of medical staff meetings which provided a
generous time-frame in which physicians could complete the questionnaire. Nonetheless, it was
noted that physicians have little patience for completing questionnaires, as some complained to
the researcher that the PTQ contained too many questions, while others completed only the first
half of the PTQ. Thus, in order to ensure that high response rates would be obtained in the large
scale administration of the PTQ, reducing the length of the instrument was a critical step in the
piloting process.
The initial version of the PTQ contained 64 items and was reduced to 37 items after the
instrument’s internal reliability was assessed. Cronbach’s alpha analyses showed that 27 items
contributed negatively to the scales’ reliabilities. Once these items were deleted, the reliability
of each scale was determined to be good. Specifically, Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was 0.771
for perfectionism, 0.831 for socio-organizational climate, 0.719 for medico-legal environment,
0.763 for provider-patient transparency, and 0.794 for medical error transparency.

Characteristics of the Physician Sample
The survey response rate was roughly 60 percent (270/450) which yielded a sample of
270 physicians. The characteristics of questionnaire respondents are summarized in Table 1.
Most of the 270 physicians were male (68.5%), married (80.0%), and white (53.3%). The
physicians in this sample represented 8 medical specialties, although the specialties with the
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strongest representations were family medicine (28.9%) and internal medicine (24.4%). Also,
80.7% were attending physicians, and 93.2% spend at least 75% of their work time on direct
patient care. The age range in this sample was 25 to 75, with a mean of 45.5 years. Years of
experience ranged from 0 to 55 years, with a mean of 12.49 years.
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Table 1. Summary of Physician Characteristics
Characteristic
Gender
Male
Female
Marital Status
Married
Single
Divorced/Separated
Widowed
Ethnicity
White
African American
Hispanic
Asian
American Indian
Other
Specialty
Family
Internal
Emergency
Surgery
Pediatrics
Anesthesiology
ObGyn
Pathology
Occupation
Staff/Attending
Resident
% Time on Direct Patient Care
100
75
50
25
10
Age
25-50
51-75
Experience
0-10
11-25
26+

Frequency Percentage % Missing
1.9
185
68.5
80
29.6
2.6
216
80.0
34
12.6
11
4.1
2
0.7
4.8
144
53.3
23
8.5
28
10.4
56
20.7
1
0.4
5
1.9
5.9
78
28.9
66
24.4
24
8.9
30
11.1
27
10.0
14
5.2
13
4.8
2
0.7
2.2
218
80.7
46
17.0
2.6
170
63.0
75
27.8
9
3.3
5
1.9
4
1.5
10
161
59.6
82
30.4
7.8
119
44.1
102
37.8
28
10.4
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Table 2 summarizes means, standard deviations, and response ranges for the exogenous
and endogenous variables. Mean imputation was used to substitute the missing values in this
analysis. The Shapiro-Wilk normality test was conducted on each of the indicators; it was found
that none were normally distributed. Thus, a log transformation using SPSS was used to
normalize the data for each indicator. The response percentages for each Likert scale response
option are reported in Appendix E.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables
Variables
Perfectionism
Self-imposed
Other-imposed
Other-directed
Image
Socio-Organizational Support
Policy
Immunity
Moral support
Peer Competition
Norms
Medico-Legal Environment
Malpractice risk
Patient litigiousness
Legislative protection
Error Reporting Transparency
No harm
Minor harm
Hospitalization
Life saving
Provider-Patient Transparency
Apology
Sympathy
Honesty

Min

Max

2
1
1
1

5
5
5
5

1
1
1
1
1

5
5
5
5
5

1
1
1

5
5
5

1
1
1
1

5
5
5
5

2
2
1

5
5
5
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Mean
3.16
3.73
3.66
2.98
2.99
2.59
2.62
2.41
2.91
2.87
1.94
3.29
3.12
3.05
4.10
3.51
3.21
3.56
3.77
3.76
3.98
3.85
4.12
3.95

Standard Deviation
0.42
0.59
0.98
0.65
0.63
0.54
0.71
0.62
1.01
1.07
0.84
0.66
0.81
0.89
0.98
0.64
0.87
0.80
0.83
0.89
0.56
0.70
0.63
0.72

Confirmatory Factor Analysis
This study examined 5 latent constructs: 1) Perfectionism; 2) Socio-Organizational
Support; 3) Medico-Legal Environment; 4) Provider-Patient Transparency; and 5) Error
Reporting Transparency. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to ascertain construct validity.
The items with insignificant factor loadings were removed from the measurement models, while
some error terms were correlated with one another to achieve model fit. The revised models
were later used to examine the hypothesized relationships between the endogenous and
exogenous variables via structural equation modeling. A Pearson correlation analysis
determined that the indicators were not highly correlated.
Measurement Model for Perfectionism
Perfectionism is an exogenous latent variable with 4 indicators: Self-imposed (SelfImp),
other imposed (OtherImp), other-directed (OtherDir), and image (Image). Some indicators were
associated with more than one questionnaire item. Therefore, the values for these indicators
were obtained by computing an average score across the items. Figure 9 illustrates the generic,
single factor model for perfectionism with standardized regression weights. All factor loadings
are statistically significant, p < .005, as is depicted by the bolded coefficients in Figure 9. The
best indicators are self-imposed and other imposed perfectionism, which account for 43% and
28% of the variance in perfectionism, respectively.
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Figure 9. Measurement Model for Perfectionism
Goodness-of-fit statistics reveal that the generic model is a good fit. The χ2/df ratio (1.64,
p = 0.19) and Root Mean Square Error Approximation (RMSEA) (0.05) are small, and the
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) (0.99), Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) (0.97), Normed Fit
Index (NFI) (0.96), and Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) (0.94) are large. Therefore, the generic model
is retained as the final measurement model for perfectionism. Table 3 presents the parameter
estimates for the perfectionism indicators.
Table 3. Parameter Estimates for Perfectionism Indicators
Standardized
Unstandardized
Critical
Items
Regression Coefficients Regression Coefficients Values
SelfImp Perfectionism
.65
1.00
OtherImp Perfectionism
.53
1.52
3.87*
OtherDir  Perfectionism
.26
.54
2.82*
Image
 Perfectionism
.41
.92
3.77*
*Denotes statistical significance at the .005 level
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Measurement Model for Socio-Organizational Climate
Socio-organizational climate is an exogenous latent variable with 5 indicators: Policy
(Policy), immunity (Immunity), peer competition (PeerCom), moral support (MorSup) and
norms (Norms). Some indicators were associated with more than one questionnaire item.
Therefore, the values for these indicators were obtained by computing an average score across
the items. Figure 10 illustrates the generic, single factor model for socio-organizational climate
with standardized regression weights. All factor loadings are found to be statistically significant,
p < .01, and are depicted by the bolded coefficients in Figure 10. The best indicators are policy,
immunity, and moral support, which account for 54%, 40%, and 35% of the variance in socioorganizational climate, respectively.

Figure 10. Measurement Model for Socio-Organizational Climate
Goodness-of-fit statistics reveal that the generic model is a good fit. The χ2/df ratio (1.62,
p = 0.15) and RMSEA (0.05) are small, and the GFI (0.99), AGFI (0.97), NFI (0.96), and TLI
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(0.97) are large. Therefore, the generic model is retained as the final measurement model for
socio-organizational climate. Table 4 presents the parameter estimates for the socioorganizational climate indicators.
Table 4. Parameter Estimates for Socio-Organizational Climate Indicators
Standardized
Unstandardized
Critical
Items
Regression Coefficients Regression Coefficients Values
Immunity Socio-Org Climate
.63
1.00
PolicySocio-Org Climate
.74
1.35
7.15*
MorSupSocio-Org Climate
.59
1.52
6.87*
NormsSocio-Org Climate
.42
.90
5.34*
PeerCom Socio-Org Climate
.19
.51
2.54*
*Denotes statistical significance at the .01 level

Measurement Model for Medico-Legal Environment
Medico-legal environment is an exogenous latent variable with 3 indicators: Legislative
protection (LegProt), patient litigiousness (PatLit), and malpractice risk (MalRisk). Some
indicators were associated with more than one questionnaire item. Therefore, the values for
these indicators were obtained by computing an average score across the items. Figure 11
illustrates the generic, single factor model for medico-legal environment with standardized
regression weights. All factor loadings are statistically significant, p < .001, as is depicted by the
bolded coefficients in Figure 11. The best indicator is malpractice risk which accounts for 60%
of the variance in medico-legal environment.
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Figure 11. Measurement Model for Medico Legal Environment
This model is just identified. Therefore, the generic model is retained as the final
measurement model for medico-legal environment. Table 5 presents the parameter estimates for
the medico-legal environment indicators.
Table 5. Parameter Estimates for Medico-Legal Environment Indicators
Standardized
Unstandardized
Critical
Items
Regression Coefficients Regression Coefficients Values
LegProt MedLegEnv
.35
1.00
PatLit MedLegEnv
.57
1.71
4.20*
MalRiskMedLegEnv
.78
2.08
3.67*
*Denotes statistical significance at the .001 level

Measurement Model for Provider-Patient Transparency
Provider-patient transparency is an exogenous latent variable with 3 indicators: Apology,
sympathy, and honesty. Some indicators were associated with more than one questionnaire item.
Therefore, the values for these indicators were obtained by computing an average score across
the items. Figure 12 illustrates the generic, single factor model for provider-patient transparency
with standardized regression weights. All factor loadings are statistically significant, p < .001, as
is depicted by the bolded coefficients in Figure 12.
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Figure 12. Generic Measurement Model for Transparency
The best indicator is apology which accounts for 63% of the variance in provider-patient
transparency. This model is just identified. Therefore, the generic model is retained as the final
measurement model for medico-legal environment. Table 6 presents the parameter estimates for
the medico-legal environment indicators.
Table 6. Parameter Estimates for Transparency Indicators
Standardized
Unstandardized
Critical
Items
Regression Coefficients Regression Coefficients Values
Apology Transparency
.79
1.00
Sympathy Transparency
.62
.66
7.49*
Honesty Transparency
.68
.87
7.64*
*Denotes statistical significance at the .001 level

Measurement Model for Error Reporting Transparency
Error reporting transparency is an exogenous latent variable with 4 indicators: No harm
(NoHarm), minor hard (MinHarm), hospitalization (hospital), and life threatening (life). Some
indicators were associated with more than one questionnaire item. Therefore, the values for
these indicators were obtained by computing an average score across the items. Figure 13
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illustrates the generic, single factor model for error reporting transparency with standardized
regression weights. All factor loadings are statistically significant, p < .001.

Figure 13. Generic Measurement Model for Error Reporting Transparency
Goodness-of-fit statistics reveal that the generic model is not a good fit. The χ2/df ratio
(37.62, p = 0.00) and RMSEA (0.37) are large, and overall, the GFI (0.88), AGFI (0.39), NFI
(0.70), and TLI (0.10) are low. Therefore, the generic model is modified as shown in Figure 14.
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Figure 14. Revised Measurement Model for Error Reporting Transparency
The best indicators are no harm and minor harm which account for 57% and 58% of the
variance in error reporting transparency, respectively. Goodness-of-fit statistics reveal that
revised model is a good fit. The χ2/df ratio (1.62, p = 0.20) and RMSEA (0.05) are small, and the
GFI (1.00), AGFI (0.9), NFI (0.99), and TLI (0.99) are large. Therefore, the revised error
reporting transparency model with correlated error terms is retained as the final model. Table 7
presents the parameter estimates for the transparency indicators.
The error terms for hospital and life were correlated (r = 0.51, p < .001). These
correlations suggest that these indicators are measuring something in common, other than an
association with the latent construct. In this case, the correlation might be a result of very similar
wording in the questions dealing with these indicators.
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Table 7. Parameter Estimates for Transparency Indicators
Standardized
Unstandardized
Critical
Items
Regression Coefficients Regression Coefficients Values
Life
Transparency
.32
1.00
Hospital Transparency
.39
1.12
5.30*
MinHarm Transparency
.76
2.08
4.27*
NoHarm Transparency
.76
2.33
4.28*
*Denotes statistical significance at the .001 level

Structural Equation Modeling
In this study, two covariance structure models were designed. The first model estimated
the causal relationships between perfectionism, socio-organizational climate, medico-legal
environment, and transparency; whereas the second model estimated the direct influences of
each socio-organizational climate indicator on transparency. Age and leadership were controlled
in the first model.
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Figure 15. Generic Covariance Structure Model: Effect of Perfectionism, Socio-Organizational
Climate, and Medico-Legal Environment on Transparency
Goodness of fit statistics reveal that the generic model fit could be improved: The χ2/df
ratio (2.48, p = 0.000) and RMSEA (0.07) are small, however, the GFI (0.87), AGFI (0.82), NFI
(0.67), and TLI (0.72) are small. In addition, several path coefficients were not statistically
significant. In light of this, medico-legal environment and age are removed from the model, as
was the causal pathway between age and error-reporting transparency. The bolded correlations in
Figure 15 represent statistically significant causal pathways. The revised model is presented in
Figure 16.
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Figure 16. Revised Covariance Structure Model: Effect of Perfectionism and SocioOrganizational Climate on Error Reporting and Provider-Patient Transparency
The revised model is a better fit. The χ2/df ratio (1.97, p = 0.000) and RMSEA (0.06) are
small, and the GFI (0.91), AGFI (0.89) are acceptable. However, the NFI (0.78), and TLI (0.85)
are still small.
As shown by the bolded coefficients in Figure 16, four pathways were found to be
statistically significant, namely: perfectionism and error reporting transparency (r = -0.19,
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p<.05), perfectionism and provider patient transparency (r = -0.22, p <.05), socio-organizational
climate and error reporting transparency (r = -0.66, p <.001), and socio-organizational climate
and provider-patient transparency (r = -0.59, p < .001). These finding suggest that as
perfectionism and perceptions of socio-organizational barriers increase, transparency scores
decrease. This model also finds that collectively, perfectionism and socio-organizational climate
account for 47% of the variance in error reporting transparency, and 46% of the variance in
provider-patient transparency. It is also shown that leadership correlates significantly with
transparency (r = -0.25, p < .001), suggesting that transparency decreases as leadership
responsibilities increase. Table 8 presents the parameter estimates for the covariance structure
model.
Table 8. Parameter Estimates for the Influence of Perfectionism and Socio-Organizational
Climate on Error Reporting and Provider-Patient Transparency
Items
Perfection ER Transp
Perfection PP Transp
SocioOrg ER Transp
SocioOrg PP Transp
Leader
PP Transp

Standardized
Unstandardized
Critical
Regression Coefficients Regression Coefficients Values
-.19
-.18
-2.02**
-.22
-.29
-2.46**
-.66
-.39
-4.10*
-.59
-.49
-5.89*
-.25
-.02
-3.92*

* Denotes statistical significance at the .001 level
** Denotes statistical significance at the .05 level

Multiple Group Analysis
Multiple group analysis was performed to test the structural equivalence of the model
across gender, occupation, and medical specialty. No significant differences were found,
suggesting that the propensity for transparency is similar across gender, occupation, and medical
specialty (i.e. surgery vs. primary care).
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Direct Influence of Socio-Organizational Climate Indicators on Transparency
The purpose of this model is merely to estimate causal pathways between various
features of the socio-organizational climate and transparency. Therefore, the revised covariance
structure model presented in Figure 16 is retained as the final model for estimating the causal
relationship between socio-organizational climate and transparency.
Figure 17 presents a covariance structure matrix where immunity, policy, moral support,
peer competition, and norms are treated as independent, observed predictors of transparency.
Four path coefficients are found to be statistically significant, namely: policy and error reporting
transparency (r = -0.40, p < .001), policy and provider-patient transparency (r = -0.24, p < .001),
immunity and provider-patient transparency (r = -0.19, p < .01), and norms and provider-patient
transparency (r = -0.15, p < .05) were statistically significant. As was found in the revised
covariance model, leadership and provider-patient transparency remain statistically significantly
related. Path coefficients between moral support, peer competition and both transparency
outcomes were not statistically significant. Table 9 presents the parameter estimates for the
relationship between transparency and the indicators for socio-organizational climate.
Table 9. Parameter Estimates for Transparency and Indicators for Socio-Organizational Climate
Items
Immunity  PP Transp
Policy
ER Transp
Policy
 PP Transp
Norms PP Transp

Standardized
Unstandardized
Critical
Regression Coefficients Regression Coefficients Values
-.19
-.09
-2.80**
-.40
-.12
-3.71***
-.24
-.10
-3.48***
-.15
-.05
-2.25*

*Denotes statistical significance at the .05 level
** Denotes statistical significance at the .01 level
*** Denotes statistical significance at the .001 level

80

Figure 17. Direct Influence of Socio-Organizational Climate Indicators on Error Reporting and
Provider-Patient Transparency
Group Mean Comparisons
In order to compare differences in the propensities for error reporting versus providerpatient transparency, a paired t-test was conducted to compare mean scores for each set of
responses. Subsequently, two repeated measures analysis of variance tests determined whether
there are significant differences in the propensities for transparency among the various error
reporting practices (no harm, minor harm, hospitalization, life-threatening) and provider-patient
transparency practices (apology, sympathy, honesty).
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The paired samples t-test revealed a significant difference between the scores for error
reporting transparency (M = 3.51, SD = 0.64) and provider-patient transparency (M = 3.98, SD =
0.56), t(269) = -13.67, p <.000.This suggests that physicians are significantly more likely to
display provider-patient transparency than they are to display error-reporting transparency.
Table 10 summarizes the results of the t-test.
Table 10. Paired T-Test Results for Error Reporting v. Provider-Patient Transparency

Pair

Mean
Std.
Std. Error
Difference Deviation
Mean
ERT-PPT 0.465
0.568
0.034

Lower Upper CI
t
df
CI
-0.532 -0.400 -13.670 269

Sig. (2tailed)
0.000

As shown in table 11, a repeated measures ANOVA with a Greenhouse-Geisser
correction determined that mean transparency scores differed statistically significantly between
types of medical errors (F(2.47, 663.52) = 42.24, p < .000). Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni
correction revealed that no harm errors are significantly less likely to be reported compared to
minor harm (p < .000), hospitalization (p < .000), and life-threatening errors (p < .000). Post hoc
tests also revealed that minor harm errors are significantly less likely to be reported compared to
hospitalization (p <.005) and life threatening errors (p <.01). There was no significant difference
between the propensities to report hospitalization and life-threatening errors. It is therefore
concluded that physicians are less inclined to report serious errors than they are to report more
serious errors. Post hoc analyses are presented in Table 12. Figure 18 presents the mean scores
in the propensities for transparency among the different error types.
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Table 11. Repeated Measures ANOVA for Error Types
Source
(GreenhouseGeisser)
Between
Within

MS
2.47
0.52

F
42.24

df
3
663.52

Sig
0.000

Table 12. Post Hoc Tests for Error Types

Propensity for Transparency

Pair
MH-NH
HOS-NH
LIF-NH
HOS-MH
LIF-MH

Mean
Difference
0.35
0.55
0.55
0.20
0.20

Std. Error Lower CI Upper CI
0.05
0.23
0.47
0.06
0.39
0.71
0.07
0.37
0.72
0.06
0.05
0.35
0.06
0.04
0.36

Sig
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.003
0.007

3.9
3.8
3.7
3.6
3.5
3.4
3.3
3.2
3.1
3
2.9
No Harm

Minor Harm

Hospital

Life Threat

Error Type

Figure 18. Propensity for Transparency according to Error Type

As shown in Table 13, a repeated measures ANOVA determined that mean transparency
scores differed statistically significantly between types of provider-patient transparency activities
(F(2, 538) = 21.64, p < .000). Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed that
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physicians are significantly less likely to apologize for a preventable error than they are to
express sympathy for a bad outcome (p < .000) and to disclose the details surrounding a bad
outcome (p <.05). Post hoc tests also revealed that physicians are significantly less likely to be
honest about the details surrounding a bad outcome than they are to express sympathy for a bad
outcome (p < .001). Post hoc analyses are presented in Table 14. Figure 19 presents the mean
scores in the propensity for transparency among the different provider-patient transparency
activities.
Table 13. Repeated Measures ANOVA for Provider-Patient Transparency Activities
Source
Between
Within

MS
4.95
0.23

F
21.64

df
2
538

Sig
0.000

Table 14. Post Hoc Tests for Provider-Patient Transparency Activities

Propensity for Transparency

Mean
Pair
Difference
SYM-APO
0.27
HON-APO
0.11
SYM-HON
0.16

Std. Error Lower CI Upper CI
0.04
0.17
0.37
0.04
0.01
0.2
0.04
0.06
0.27

Sig
0.000
0.026
0.001

4.15
4.1
4.05
4
3.95
3.9
3.85
3.8
3.75
3.7
Apology

Honesty

Sympathy

Provider-Patient Transparency Activity

Figure 19. Propensity for Transparency according to Provider-Patient Transparency Activity
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Chapter Summary
Confirmatory factor analyses validated perfectionism, socio-organizational support,
medico-legal environment, provider-patient transparency, and error reporting transparency.
Structural equation modeling found that as perfectionism and perceptions of socio-organizational
barriers increase, transparency scores decrease. This model also finds that perfectionism and
socio-organizational climate collectively account for nearly half of the variance in both
transparency outcomes. It is also shown that leadership is significantly negatively correlated
with transparency suggesting that transparency decreases as leadership responsibilities increase.
Multiple group analysis showed that this model was valid across gender, medical specialty, and
occupation.
The results of the t-test showed that physicians are more inclined to engage in providerpatient transparency than they are to formally report medical errors. Analysis of variance tests
revealed that physicians are more inclined to report serious errors compared to less serious
errors. Also, physicians have stronger tendencies to express sympathy for bad outcomes than
they do to apologize for a preventable error or be honest about the details surrounding bad
outcomes.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION
Perfectionism
Construct Validity
In this study, perfectionism consisted of four facets. The first facet related to ideals of
infallibility that physicians impose on themselves; the second facet related to expectations of
infallibility that are imposed on physicians by patients and the healthcare profession; the third
facet related to perfectionist standards that the physician projects onto patients and colleagues;
and the fourth facet related to projecting an outward image of the infallible physician.
The results of the confirmatory factor analysis revealed that self-imposed perfectionism is
the best indicator, accounting for 43% of the variance in the perfectionism, followed by otherimposed (28%), image (17%), and other-directed (7%) perfectionism. This suggests that
perfectionism among physicians manifests itself primarily via self-imposed expectations of
infallibility. However, these findings also support Flett and Hewitt’s notion that perfectionism is
a complex, multifaceted trait that includes both intrapersonal (e.g. self-directed) and
interpersonal (e.g. other-imposed) dimensions.
Hypothesis Testing
Perfectionism was found to be significantly related to transparency, and as such, this
research rejects the hypotheses that there is no relationship between perfectionism and
transparency outcomes. Specifically, it was shown that the propensity for both types of
transparency decreases as perfectionism scores increase. This suggests that perfectionism is a
significant barrier to transparency. However, it should also be noted that the coefficients
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describing these relationships were weak, meaning that perfectionism is not a major contributor
to transparency.
Eradicating perfectionism in medicine is not going to be easy. For one thing, change
efforts would need to be directed at medical education curricula and health provider
organizations to ensure that current and future generations of physicians reduce their
perfectionist tendencies. As such, medical education leaders should identify the student-teacher
dynamics that cultivate harsh and unproductive self-criticism. In addition, it might be
worthwhile to develop organizational programs that raise physicians’ awareness about
perfectionism and identify how this attitude can be destructive to quality improvement efforts. It
may also be useful to examine the manner in which clinical performance standards are
communicated and interpreted by physicians. In the end, a transparent culture is more likely to
emerge if the pursuit for perfectionism is replaced with a pursuit for excellence.
Directions for Future Research
Other definitions of perfectionism may also be used to explain physician transparency.
For example, Hamachek (1978) differentiates normal perfectionism from neurotic perfectionism.
Normal perfectionists set high standards for themselves yet leave room for imprecision, and thus
are able to derive pleasure from even the most painstaking efforts. On the other hand, neurotic
perfectionists do not tolerate any level of error and thus are never satisfied by their
accomplishments. Scholars in the field of psychology have suggested that neurotic
perfectionism is a maladaptive trait whereas normal perfectionism is adaptive (Parker, 1997;
Rice & Preusser, 2002). Given this distinction, it might be valuable to investigate whether
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maladaptive perfectionism is a barrier to transparency, and likewise, whether adaptive
perfectionism can facilitate a culture of learning and openness in healthcare.

Socio-Organizational Climate
Construct Validity
In the context of this study, “socio-organizational” refers to the perceived interpersonal
and institutional influences that impede or encourage transparency. Thus, socio-organizational
climate was operationally defined by a number of indicators, including the presence of policies
and clear reporting guidelines that encourage reporting and disclosure activities; immunity from
punishment and a damaged reputation for reporting errors; the existence of moral support
systems to help physicians cope with the emotional consequences of medical error; peer
competition among colleagues; and professional norms that encourage learning from mistakes.
The results of the confirmatory factor analysis showed that policy, immunity, and moral
support are the best indicators of socio-organizational climate. Policies alone explain 54% of the
variance in this construct, followed by immunity (40%), moral support (35%), norms (18%), and
peer competition (3%). These results suggest that the socio-organizational atmosphere is largely
determined by the nature of policies that pertain to transparency behaviors. The findings also
show that socio-organizational climate is a complex variable that includes both structural (e.g.
policies) and cultural dimensions (e.g. norms).
Hypothesis Testing
The relationships between socio-organizational climate and the two transparency
outcomes were statistically significant and were also considered to be strong. Therefore, this
study rejects the hypotheses that there is no relationship between socio-organizational climate
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and transparency outcomes. Specifically, it was found that socio-organizational climate is a
significant barrier to both provider-patient and error reporting transparency. What this suggests
is that transparency barriers largely exist within institutional walls, which in turn emphasizes the
importance developing patient safety programs at the organizational level.
In addition, this study also rejects the hypothesis that there are no differences in the
predictive strengths of policy, immunity, norms, peer competition, and moral support.
Specifically, it was found that policy had the greatest influence on both transparency outcomes;
whereas immunity and norms were significantly related to provider-patient transparency only.
These results suggest that policies that encourage error reporting and provide physicians
with clear reporting and disclosure guidelines can contribute significantly to both transparency
outcomes. Also, alleviating physicians’ concerns about incurring a tarnished reputation, as well
as upholding professional norms that encourage learning from mistakes can stimulate providerpatient transparency.
It is interesting to note that the questions pertaining to socio-organizational climate
yielded more missing data compared to the other constructs. Also, an average of 29% of
physician participants reported having “mixed feelings” for the questions relating to policies and
immunity, which far exceeds the mixed feelings response rate for the other constructs. It is
believed that both non-responses and mixed-feeling responses are largely a result of physicians’
lack of awareness about the organization’s policies and procedures for error reporting and
disclosure; considering that “don’t know” was not included as a response option, physicians may
have used the mixed feelings response to indicate their lack of awareness. If policies and
immunity are in fact the strongest predictors of transparency – a finding that was supported in
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this research – then it is reasonable to suggest that simply communicating the policies that are
already in place can have a positive impact on transparency.
Peer competition did not contribute significantly to transparency. Although it might not
hurt to establish an atmosphere of collegiality among physician-colleagues, peer competition
does not present itself as a barrier to reporting errors or to disclosing bad outcomes to patients
and families. Moral support was also found to be an insignificant barrier - a surprising finding
given the extent of literature that touts moral support systems as an effective way to provide
physicians with the psychological safety they need to engage in transparency (e.g. Dubovsky &
Schrier, 1983). However, it should be noted that 5% of physician respondents did not answer
this question, and 33% of physicians reported mixed feelings, again suggesting that physicians
may simply be unaware of organizational support systems that can help them cope with error.

One peculiar finding in this research is that leadership was negatively related to providerpatient transparency though it was not related to error-reporting transparency. In other words, as
physicians’ leadership responsibilities increase, the less likely they are to engage in providerpatient transparency.

Directions for Future Research
The finding that the socio-organizational climate contributes significantly to transparency
suggests that future research endeavors should more thoroughly identify the factors that underlie
a healthy work atmosphere in healthcare. The socio-organizational climate indicators used in
this study undoubtedly do not represent the full range of factors that likely encourage
transparency. For example, several features in the Morbidity and Mortality Conferences
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(M&MC) can present themselves as barriers and facilitators of transparency, such as the
frequency of M&MCs, the selection of errors discussed, whether M&MCs are routinely used in
specialties other than surgery, and the levels of hostility and defensiveness that characterize
M&MCs (Orlander, Barber, & Fincke, 2002; Pierliussi, Fischer, Campbell, & Landefeld, 2003;
Bosk, 1979).
Recommendations and Suggestions for Organizational Change
Gallagher and Levinson (2005) outline several steps for medical professionals to enhance
disclosure, including enhancing disclosure policies, training clinicians on how to disclose error,
specifying disclosure content and timing, and integrating quality improvement and disclosure
activities. The physician should also receive immunity pursuant to error reporting or disclosure.
Nonetheless, immunity in this sense does not imply a freedom from accountability. It means
upholding the tenant of innocence until proven guilty rather than placing the physician in the
“position of being guilty until he/she can prove himself/herself innocent” (California Medicine,
1969).
Nonetheless, staff resistance to organizational change is a barrier to be overcome in the
pursuit for a transparent culture (Audet, Raju, Jacobs, Schick, & Aviles, 2008). Given that
change represents the death of the status quo (Bozak, 2004) and the loss of familiar routine
(Applebaum & Wohl, 2000), a consistent finding about organizational change in healthcare is
that it does not come easily (Ingersoll, Fisher, Ross, Soja, & Kidd, 2001; Schoolfield & Orduna,
1994). Considering the anxiety surrounding the issue of transparency in healthcare, incremental
change might be more readily embraced than radical transformation. In light of this, an
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alternative to creating new structures for achieving transparency is to update those that have
already been established.
One such example is found at Northwestern Memorial Hospital in Chicago where the
Patient Safety M&MC was initiated to encourage open, interdisciplinary discussion of patient
safety problems and to “promote systems-based thinking among clinicians” (Szekendi, Barnard,
& Creamer, 2010, p. 6). Although the M&MC has a reputation for perpetuating a culture of
shame and blame (Goldberg et al., 2002), it also presents healthcare leaders with a golden
opportunity to gradually institutionalize transparency throughout the organization. The idea here
is that changing the tone of the M&MC by establishing a non-threatening and non-judgmental
atmosphere can cause ripple effects that are felt throughout the entire organization.
The finding that moral support has no effect on transparency might be explained by
physicians’ reluctance to make use of support services, and for this reason organizations are not
reaping the benefits, at least in terms of disclosure activity. A number of reasons would explain
why physicians consciously avoid counseling, including a lack of emotional self-awareness, a
fear of dealing with emotions, and perhaps most importantly – the fear and reluctance to
acknowledge their involvement in a medical error. However, a well-designed MM&C that is
guided by the mutually supportive principles of learning and forgiveness, and which is led by
morally courageous physicians who are willing to openly share their mistakes with their peers could potentially change all of this. According to Pierliussi and colleagues’ (2003), adverse
outcomes and errors are frequently discussed at M&MCs; however, teachers often fail to
recognize failure as error per se, and moreover, refrain from using explicit language that
acknowledges their personal involvement with the error. This I-It relationship with medical error
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- which on the one hand may serve to protect the physician’s self-esteem - also prevents the
physician from taking full responsibility for the mistake, and from experiencing the healing and
transformation that forgiveness brings.
McIntyre and Popper (1983) put forth a new paradigm for professional ethics in
medicine, namely, one that is guided by the willingness to admit and even search for error.
Unfortunately, this paradigm would still be considered “new” today, even though it was
conceived nearly two decades ago. This professional ethos is eloquently summarized in the
following statement:
These standards of objective truth and criticism may teach him to try again and to
think again; to challenge his own conclusions, and to use his imagination in trying to
find whether and where his own conclusions are at fault. They may teach him to
apply the method of trial and error in every field, especially in science; and thus they
may teach him how to learn from his mistakes, and how to search for them. These
standards may help him to discover how little he knows and how much there is he
does now know. They may help him to grow in knowledge, and also to realize that
he is growing. They may help him to become aware of the fact that he owes his
growth to other people’s criticism and that reasonableness is readiness to listen to
criticism. (McIntyre & Popper, 1978, p.1919)

Medico-Legal Environment
Construct Validity
In the context of this study, “medico-legal” refers to the perceived societal influences that
impede or encourage transparency. Thus, medico-legal environment was operationally defined
by three indicators, namely: The degree of faith in malpractice laws to protect physicians from
unfair accusations and frivolous lawsuits; the perception that patients and families are litigious;
and the degree of organizational anxiety about medical malpractice.
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The results of the confirmatory factor analysis showed that the best indicator is
malpractice risk as it accounts for 60% of the variance in medico-legal environment, followed by
patient litigiousness (33%) and litigious protection (12%).
Hypothesis Testing
This research finds that medico-legal environment is not a significant predictor of either
transparency outcome. This was a somewhat surprising finding given the extent of literature
about the harmful effects of a litigious society on disclosure practices, especially as it relates to
provider-patient transparency. At the same time, this finding further validates the notion that
poor transparency is an issue that should be addressed primarily within healthcare institutions.
The absence of a significant relationship between medico-legal environment and
transparency is partly explained by Gallagher and colleagues (2007) who suggest that top-down
regulation is not suitable for enhancing disclosure activity. The first problem is that enforcing
disclosure is a “formidable challenge” and that monitoring the frequency and quality of reports
would require substantial resources as well as a comprehensive error reporting system, which has
yet to emerge. Another shortcoming with regulatory oversight is that it would necessarily apply
“cookbook” rules to situations which should be considered unique, and therefore dealt with on a
case-by-case basis. The reality is that disclosure conversations are not amenable to such rules as
there is no single way to effectively disclose bad outcomes.
Directions for Future Research
Not all aspects of the medico-legal environment were addressed in this research. For
instance, some research finds that quasi-regulatory bodies, such as the JCAHO, exert
considerable influences on health provider organizations to adopt a variety of patient safety goals
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(Devers, Pham, & Liu, 2004). As such, one line of inquiry would be to ask physicians about
their degree of understanding and compliance with mandates set forth by these entities.
Other patient safety groups with considerable influence on healthcare organizations are
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Institute for Healthcare Improvement, the
Association for Healthcare Research and Quality, the Leapfrog Group, the National Quality
Forum, the National Foundation for Patient Safety, and the National Association for Healthcare
Quality. Given that healthcare is seeing a burgeoning of organizations and programs that are
dedicated to improving patient safety, it would be interesting to ask physicians and other health
professionals about the effectiveness of these initiatives, and to determine whether their
perceptions influence transparency practices.

Transparency Outcomes
Construct Validity
Provider-patient transparency consisted of three indicators: Apologizing for preventable
errors, expressing sympathy for bad outcomes, and disclosing the full details surrounding bad
outcomes. Confirmatory factor analysis revealed that apology was the best indicator as it
accounted for 63% of the variance in provider-patient transparency, followed by honesty (46%),
and sympathy (38%).
Error reporting transparency included four indicators that measured the propensity to
report no harm errors, minor harm errors, errors requiring hospital admission or extending
patient stay, and life-threatening errors resulting in a successful life-saving intervention.
Confirmatory factor analysis revealed that no harm and minor harm were the best indicators as
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they accounted for 57% and 58% of the variance in error-reporting transparency respectively,
followed by hospitalization (15%), and life-threatening (11%).
The results of this research validate the notion that error reporting transparency and
provider-patient transparency are theoretically distinct variables. Although this might seem like
a complicated approach to measuring transparency, the advantage of working with separate
variables is that it allows us to identify the unique effects of certain predictors. For example, in
this research it was found that norms, immunity, and leadership were significant predictors of
provider-patient transparency only.
Furthermore, the results of this research have important implications for the development
of transparency assessments. The finding that all indicators put forth in this study contributed
significantly to each variable’s construct validity is evidence that transparency is a multifaceted
variable that consists of a wide range of behaviors. However, the poorest performers are the
indicators that measured the propensity to report serious errors. In other words, as the severity of
the error increases, the indicator’s contribution to construct validity decreases. Because the
physicians in this sample were more likely to admit to not reporting no harm and minor harm
errors compared to not reporting hospitalization and life-threatening errors (see Appendix E), the
serious error questions were not as reliable. Stated differently, the questions about serious errors
were not as effective at discriminating between respondents who are very transparent from those
who are very non-transparent compared to the questions about less serious errors.
At the same time, the PTQ asked different questions for no harm and minor harm errors
versus hospitalization and life-threatening errors. Although all four indicators were associated
with the question “In the event of a medical error that (severity of harm), my routine practice is
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to report the error to…”, the no harm and minor harm errors were also associated with the
question “There are past instances of medical errors which resulted in (severity of harm) which I
did not report”. This question was not posed with regard to hospitalization and life-threatening
errors. Because these types of errors occur less often and thus do not describe the experience of
every physician, presenting physicians with this statement would have produced misleading
results. For example, if a physician-respondent never committed an error that resulted in a lifesaving intervention, and subsequently disagreed with the statement “There are past instances of
medical errors which resulted in (severity of harm) that I did not report”, then that response
could be interpreted in two ways: 1) the physician is transparent, or 2) the physician never
encountered this type of error. All this is to say that differences in the questions underlying each
indicator might explain why reliability was compromised in the serious error questions.
Aside from highlighting the sheer complexity of developing a transparency instrument,
this suggests that future assessments should either attempt to measure serious errors more
reliably, or consider limiting the assessment by excluding questions that gauge the propensity to
report serious errors. In addition, to further develop and refine these variables, new indicators
should be integrated into their respective measurement models. For instance, it may be
worthwhile to compare the propensities to report and disclose medication errors, treatment
errors, diagnosis errors, error of commission, and errors of omission. Undoubtedly, more
research is needed to fully understand the etiological factors underlying transparency behaviors.

97

Hypothesis Testing
Error reporting versus provider-patient transparency
This research finds that the mean score for error reporting transparency differed
significantly from the mean score for provider-patient transparency. Therefore, the hypothesis
that there is no difference in the propensities for both types of transparency is rejected.
Specifically, it was found that the means for error reporting transparency were significantly
lower than the means for provider-patient transparency.
As was hypothesized, both types of transparency practices present similar psychological
obstacles, however, error reporting transparency involves more practical barriers. In order to
engage in error reporting, the physician has to go through a formal process which involves
completing forms and making a number of complex decisions - from deciding whether the
adverse outcome was a mistake versus a natural consequence of the illness, to deciding how and
who to report to. On the other hand, depending on the severity of the outcome, provider-patient
transparency can be as simple and straightforward as having a conversation.
Blendon and colleagues (2002) found that the issue most frequently identified by
physicians as being problematic was the cost of medical malpractice and lawsuits, and
furthermore, found that physicians did not identify medical errors as being one of the most
pressing problems in healthcare. These findings explain the discrepancy found in this research
between error reporting and provider-patient transparency. These findings also suggest that
unlike medical malpractice, the lack of urgency among physicians for reducing the incidence of
medical errors might be a result of a lack of incentives/disincentives. And as we all well know,
an effective reward system is often what dictates levels of human motivation.
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An alternative explanation emerges from a study which found that 70% of physicians
agreed that their main responsibility is to the individual patient rather than to society, whereas
only 17% disagreed with this notion (Beach, Meredith, Halpern, Wells, & Ford, 2005). Given
that provider-patient transparency emphasizes the well-being of individual patients via a healthy
doctor-patient relationship, whereas error reporting transparency promotes the greater good by
reducing errors for everyone, we can infer that the stronger inclination to engage in providerpatient transparency stems from physicians’ stronger sense of loyalty for individual patients.
Comparing error reporting transparency responses
This research finds that the mean scores for no harm, minor harm, hospital, and life
threatening errors will be significantly different from each other, and therefore rejects the
hypothesis that no differences exist in the propensity for transparency between different types of
errors. Specifically, it was found that physicians are more inclined to report no harm errors
compared to minor harm, hospitalization, and life-threatening errors; and that physicians are
more inclined to report minor harm errors compared to hospitalization and serious errors. A
competing explanation is that it is easier to admit the failure to report less serious errors than it is
to admit not reporting serious errors. By the same token, less serious errors are usually less
noticeable, which suggests that if the physician is the only witness to the error, then they might
feel less compelled to report it as there is no third party that will hold them accountable. Thus,
the present study finds a curvilinear relationship between error severity and error reporting
transparency which is depicted in Figure 20.
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Propensity for Error Reporting
Transparency

Error Severity
Figure 20. Hypothesized relationship between Error Severity and Error Reporting Transparency
Comparing provider-patient transparency responses
This research finds that the mean scores for apology, sympathy, and honesty are
significantly different from each other and thus rejects the hypothesis that no differences exist in
the propensity to engage in different types of provider-patient transparency practices.
Specifically, it was found that physicians are less inclined to apologize than they are to express
sympathy and honesty, and that they are less inclined to be honest than sympathetic.
An obvious explanation for these differences is that the apology questions asked the
physician about saying “I’m sorry” for a preventable medical error, which would therefore
involve an admission of guilt; whereas the sympathy and honesty questions pertained to bad
outcomes in general (i.e. preventable and non-preventable) and thus may not cast the physician
in a negative light.
Similar reasoning might also explain the observed difference between sympathy and
honesty. The questions about sympathy simply asked physicians whether they would express
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sympathy for a bad outcome; whereas the honesty questions asked physicians whether they
would disclose the full details surrounding bad outcomes. Hence, if physicians feel that
disclosing high levels of clinical detail gives patients the ammunition to file a malpractice claim,
then it is not surprising to observe a greater inclination to express sympathy than to display
honesty.
Directions for Future Research
With regard to provider-patient transparency, this study measured the propensity to
engage in provider-patient transparency behaviors. However, there are other ways to measure
this form of transparency. Sweet and Bernat (1997) found that physicians’ willingness to
disclose errors to patients decreased as the severity of the error increased. Gallagher and
colleagues (2003) reported that most physicians opposed disclosing near misses (i.e. no harm
errors) because they felt that this would diminish patient trust and increase patient anxiety. The
findings from both studies collectively suggest a curvilinear relationship between error severity
and provider-patient transparency, such that physicians are less inclined to disclose non serious
and very serious errors, and more inclined to errors that are moderately serious. This theoretical
relationship (illustrated in Figure 21) is slightly different than the curvilinear trend that was
reported in the present study with respect to the propensity to formally report errors. The
primary difference is that error reporting transparency plateaus towards the higher end of the
error severity scale (see Figure 20), whereas provider-patient transparency levels tend to fall as
the error becomes more severe.
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Propensity for Provider-Patient
Transparency

Error Severity
Figure 21. Hypothesized relationship between Error Severity and Provider-Patient Transparency
In light of these findings, it might be worthwhile to test the validity of both models as this
could provide clues about the cognitive psychology that underlies error reporting and disclosure,
and consequently, allow patient safety experts to design disclosure programs more effectively. It
might also be of interest to determine if the same trends would be observed across transparency
behaviors (e.g. apology, sympathy, and honesty), namely, whether physicians use different
behavioral responses depending on the severity of the error or bad outcome.
A longitudinal design may also be applied to this research in order to test the
effectiveness or transparency training programs at the organizational and/or departmental levels.
Here, Fishbein and Ajzen’s theory of reasoned action could be used to model how intentions to
report errors (as measured by the construct “Error Reporting Transparency” in Figure 22) predict
their actual reporting behaviors (as measured by “Number of Error Reports”). According to this
model, several causal pathways would be investigated. First, the model would measure the
direct, indirect, and lagged effects of the training program on physicians’ intentions to report
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medical errors. Second, it would measure the effects of physicians’ intentions to report on their
actual reporting behaviors. Finally, this model can also capture any testing threats that occur as a
result of repeatedly assessing of physicians’ intentions to report. Lastly, it is expected that the
number of error reports will increase between the pretest and posttest #1 because the training
program will have encouraged physicians to report errors; however, if the program is indeed
effective, the number of error reports is expected to decrease between posttest #1 and posttest #2
given that in this time frame, physicians will have learned from their mistakes which in turn
would prevent the recurrence of error.

Figure 22. Longitudinal Design for Effectiveness of Transparency Training Program
Limitations
There are several limitations in this study. First, data was collected from only one
hospital system in the state of Florida. As such, it is possible that both institution-specific
differences in physicians’ propensities for transparency and state-specific differences in medicolegal climates would influence the results. Therefore, these factors limit the generalizability of
the findings to other settings. Future research should therefore address this limitation by cross103

validating the covariance model across several hospitals in that represent the various geographic
regions in the country. Future research should also attempt to validate the model on other
healthcare workers such as nurses, patient care technicians, allied health professionals, and
hospital administrators as these populations may yield different findings about the predictors of
transparency.
Another suggestion for future research is to test the model on a larger sample. Although
there is much disagreement about appropriate sample size for confirmatory factor analysis and
structural equation modeling, the general consensus is that larger samples yield better quality
results. Also, it is recommended to include a wider range of indicators for medico-legal barriers
and provider-patient transparency seeing that these models were just identified.
Another limitation is that the questionnaire was based on self-reported data, thus, it is not
known whether the reported levels of transparency are accurate. It should be noted that the PTQ
was an anonymous questionnaire, and that physicians were assured that their identities could not
be revealed by reviewing responses. Nonetheless, physicians’ responses may have been
influenced by social desirability. This in turn may have produced overestimated or
underestimated causal relationships between the transparency predictors and outcomes.
Additionally, the majority of physician-respondents were meeting attendees, which may
have compromised internal and external validity. Some of the meetings were voluntary, and
therefore the physicians who attended them may be different from those who did not attend in a
way that is relevant to this research. For instance, attendees may have stronger tendencies for
organizational citizenship, which may in turn indicate that they are more transparent than
physicians who do not attend meetings.
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Also, several limitations which are inherent in structural equation modeling (SEM)
should be mentioned. First, the correlations generated through SEM can only describe
relationships, and therefore no causal inferences can be made. In addition, model fit could be
sample specific and as such, not be generalizable to physicians in other settings.
Lastly, single source bias may also have affected the results. Single source bias emerges
as an issue when both independent and dependent variables are measured using the same source,
as was done in this study. Therefore, there is a possibility that the observed relationships
between the study variables were inflated.

Conclusions
Implications for Practice
The covariance structure model was replicated across medical specialty (i.e. surgery and
primary care), gender, and occupation (i.e. staff and resident). This lends greater support to the
model as it suggests that the relationships therein specified generalize across certain groups of
physicians. The practical implication of this finding is that changes in policies, immunity
practices, and professional norms could enhance transparency among physicians, regardless of
gender, specialty, or occupation.
The major finding in this research is that perfectionism and socio-organizational climate
collectively explain about half of the variance in each transparency outcome. However, socioorganizational climate was a considerably stronger predictor compared to perfectionism. In a
sense, the findings of this research are heartening because they propose rather simple solutions
(e.g. organizational policy redesign) for a complex problem. This does not imply that addressing
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policies and norms will solve the entire transparency problem; however, it does suggest that a
few small changes can yield noteworthy improvements in outcomes related to patient safety and
malpractice risk management. Thus, the findings emphasize the responsibility of patient safety
leaders and risk managers to ensure that both the structural and cultural barriers to transparency
are removed. As Edmund Pellegrino (2004) puts it:
Systems cannot make the professionals within them virtuous, but they can make it
possible for virtuous professionals to be virtuous. Correspondingly, a defective
system can discourage even the conscientious individual or reduce his or her
aspirations to nothing higher than the level of the average. (p.84)
This study’s emphasis on socio-organizational climate also points out that transparency
would be best achieved via bottom-up, grassroots change efforts. One way to instigate this type
of change is to create incentive structures that will endow physicians with enough courage to
speak up about their mistakes, in spite of the constraints that are imposed by the self and others.
Although on the surface rewarding error disclosure seems inappropriate (as we do not want to
reinforce the notion that errors are good), we would not expect such incentive systems to be
implemented by regulatory bodies through financial or accreditation inducements. Instead, we
could use the Morbidity & Mortality Conferences as a setting where physicians are rewarded
with admiration and respect - in other words, intangible rewards - for willingly and openly
sharing their personal experiences with medical error and for renouncing their identification with
the “infallible doctor”. This is not to suggest that accountability for error should be overlooked;
rather, it should not be inconceivable to thank physicians, like David Hilfiker for instance, for
offering a public confession, all the while applying corrective measures to prevent the error from
being repeated.
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There is a lot of misunderstanding about what it means to apologize and be forgiven.
When it comes to dealing with medical mistakes, error reporting transparency is only half the
battle. A physician who formally reports a medical error and even relays the experience to
colleagues has yet to complete their journey to forgiveness, that is, by engaging in providerpatient transparency. “Cheap grace”, a term that medical ethicist Nancy Berlinger often uses in
the context of dealing with medical error, overlooks the role of the injured party as an agent of
forgiveness, or assumes that forgiveness should occur reflexively, namely, in the absence of
apology, accountability, or compensation (Berlinger, 2003). She points out that various
members of the healthcare system, including chaplains and social workers, pressure patients to
forgive their healthcare providers by reminding them that “good people are forgiving”.
However, when the relational aspect of pardoning someone is overlooked, both the physician and
the patient are denied the opportunity to feel the restorative power of forgiveness.
Implications for Theory and Public Affairs
The findings herein provide support for Chin and Benne’s (1983) normative-re-educative
strategy by showing that norms and values (i.e. in the form of professional norms, postdisclosure immunity, and transparency policies) are important drivers of organizational change.
This study also demonstrated the influence of both individual (e.g. perfectionism) and group
level factors (e.g. socio-organizational climate) on organizational change. Therefore, Chin and
Benne’s theory may inform organizational leaders in healthcare and other industries that
successful change hinges upon the ability to identify the structural and cultural barriers that
manifest themselves at the individual and group levels.
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Although the concepts of error and quality of care have been the sustained focus in
healthcare for the last decade, the fields represented in public affairs are no more immune to
quality chasms. Moreover, errors in public affairs are no less egregious than errors in medicine.
In social work, systemic errors in the adoption process can cause children to be placed in the
wrong homes. In criminal justice, faulty sentencing guidelines can result in prison overcrowding
and elevated crime rates. In governance and public administration, the failure to engage in
evidence-based decision-making causes public funds to be misused and wasted.
It is of the utmost importance that we advance our conceptual and operational
understandings of what constitutes “error” in each respective field. Recently, healthcare
provider organizations have been under constant scrutiny to ensure that quality standards are
met. Since the IOM announced a decade ago that as many as 98,000 deaths are a result of
medical errors, which also coincided with the World Health Organization’s (2000) report which
ranked the US healthcare system as the 37th in the world, healthcare has seen a burgeoning of
institutions that are dedicated to improving patient safety and healthcare quality. JCAHO, for
instance, has acquired much clout as far as accreditation is concerned as a recent study reported
JCAHO as the primary driver of patient safety initiatives in healthcare organizations (Devers,
Pham, & Liu, 2004). In addition, a number of toolkits and benchmarking instruments have been
put forth by the Leapfrog Group and the National Quality Forum to support organizational
efforts to enhance healthcare quality. Lastly, today’s healthcare consumers can be much more
selective about choosing their providers thanks to a number of organizations that publish up-todate hospital performance reports (e.g. www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov, www.leapfroggroup.org).
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This then begs the question, “Why is healthcare held to a different standard?” This is not
to suggest that the quality of healthcare services is superior to the quality of services provided by
any other public affairs institution. Rather, healthcare experienced a turning point when several
alarming reports unveiled to the public that healthcare quality in the US is substandard. The
response to this public scrutiny was to put measures in place that would increase accountability.
Consequently, healthcare has become increasingly practical about closing its quality chasm, and
in this sense can proffer two important lessons to other industries about embracing change: Be
proactive, and be pragmatic.
Recent national disasters including 9/11, hurricane Katrina, and the financial crisis have
inarguably heightened the public’s expectations of accountability and transparency in the
conduct of public affairs; so, what is not lacking is a wake-up call about the gravity of our
current state of affairs. Now is the time for thoughtful, studious action. One of the main
findings in this research is that small changes can produce big results – a key principle of quality
improvement. For example, Festinger and Pratt (2002) found that a small change in New York
State’s family court procedures shortened the duration of time between the termination of
parental rights and adoption finalizations, and more importantly, increased the number of child
adoptions. The change in question: Permitting an adoption to be filed while the termination of
parental rights is still pending. And as was suggested by this research, sometimes, small changes
can lead to very positive results.
In addition, the finding that socio-organizational climate is a major determinant of
transparency can inform change efforts in public affairs institutions by emphasizing the value of
grassroots change and participative democracy. Public sector entities should be encouraged to
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develop innovative yet simple solutions such as those put forth by Festinger and Pratt, so that the
idea of change becomes less daunting and the excuse that “it’s too complicated” is laid to rest.
Although the notion of error can invoke feelings of guilt and ineptitude, we need only realize that
dealing with error in any field is merely a willingness to recognize the difference between what
is and what ought to be.

Chapter Summary
In support of Chin and Benne’s normative re-educative strategy, perfectionism and socioorganizational support were significant predictors of error reporting and provider-patient
transparency, which points out that paying attention to these two factors can allow patient safety
advocates and malpractice risk managers to achieve their respective goals. Nonetheless, socioorganizational climate had the strongest influence on transparency, as perfectionism was
considered a weaker predictor. This suggests that change efforts would need to be directed at
medical education curricula and health provider organizations to ensure that current and future
generations of physicians reduce their perfectionist tendencies. Also, a number of institutional
changes are recommended, such as communicating transparency policies and disclosure
guidelines to physicians, upholding professional norms that encourage learning from mistakes,
and reassuring physicians that reporting and disclosure activities will not jeopardize their
reputation.
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FH IRB Protocol #: 2775-4360 version 5/25/11

Principal Investigator: Bianca Perez, MS
Co-Investigator: Dr. Stephen Knych, MD
Research Mentor: Dr. Aaron Liberman, PhD

Research Site: Florida Hospital

Dear Physician,
The University of Central Florida has partnered with Florida Hospital to conduct a research study
designed to learn more about physicians’ attitudes about their profession and their health care
organization.
We would like to invite you to take part in this study. Participation in the study is voluntary. About 10
minutes of your time is required to complete the attached questionnaire.
Your responses are entirely anonymous; your name will not be on the questionnaire.
You do not have to take part in this study or you can stop the questionnaire at any time without fear of
repercussions.
If you have questions concerning this study or the questionnaire, contact the study physician, Dr.
Stephen Knych at 407-303-4029 .
If you have problems, concerns, suggestions or questions about your rights as a research participant,
please contact the Florida Hospital Institutional Review Board at (407) 303-5581. The purpose of the IRB
is to protect the rights and welfare of people who take part in research studies.
If you are interested in obtaining a copy of the results, please communicate with the Principal Investigator
via e-mail (biancaperez@knights.ucf.edu) or by phone (561-862-8064).
Thank you very much for your comments and participation in this research effort.
Sincerely,

Bianca Perez, MS
Principal Investigator

Stephen A. Knych, MD, MBA
Co-investigator
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Please circle your answer
SA = Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree

A = Agree

MF = Mixed Feelings

D = Disagree

SD =

1. Patients have unusually high expectations of me.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

2. The error reporting policy in my organization offers confidentiality to those who report
errors.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

3. I am usually concerned that my failures will disappoint patients or colleagues.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

4. Malpractice legislation in Florida protects me against wrongful accusations and frivolous
lawsuits.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

5. My routine practice is to provide patients and families with complete explanations for bad
outcomes.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

6. My organization encourages error reporting.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

7. Criticism about my performance as a clinician usually makes me feel defensive.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

8. My routine practice is to apologize to patients and families in the event of a preventable
medical error.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

9. My organization provides clear guidelines on how to disclose bad outcomes to patients and
families.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

10. Mistakes and failures in healthcare usually cause me to feel shame.
SA

A

MF

D

SD
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11. In the event of a medical error that results in an injury that is easily treated and has no
lasting effects, my routine practice is to report the error to at least one of the following
entities: internal or external reporting agency, supervisor, manager, physician chief,
department leader, or health care executive.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

12. Malpractice litigation is a common occurrence in my organization.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

13. In my organization, the reputation of professionals who report or disclose medical errors is
likely to be compromised.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

14. Healthcare has unusually high expectations of me.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

15. My routine practice is to express sympathy to patients and families in the event of a bad
outcome.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

16. The error reporting system in my organization is usually non-punitive.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

17. There are past instances of bad outcomes for which I did not provide complete explanations
to patients and families.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

18. I have a tendency to strive for excessively high standards in healthcare.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

19. There are past instances of preventable medical errors that did no harm which I did not
formally report.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

20. Patients and families are often inclined to initiate malpractice litigation.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

21. My organization usually offers moral or emotional support to clinicians in the aftermath of a
bad outcome.
SA

A

MF

D

SD
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22. There are past instances of preventable medical errors for which I did not apologize to
patients and families.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

23. I am usually willing to admit when I am wrong in healthcare situations.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

24. My organization encourages the disclosure of bad outcomes.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

25. There are past instances of preventable medical errors that resulted in injury that is easily
treated and has no lasting effects which I did not formally report.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

26. My patients often disappoint me.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

27. My organization provides clear guidelines on how to report errors.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

28. In the event of a medical error that results in no harm, my routine practice is to report the
error to at least one of the following entities: internal or external reporting agency,
supervisor, manager, physician chief, department leader, or health care executive.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

29. My professional culture usually encourages learning from mistakes.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

30. There are past instances of bad outcomes for which I did not express sympathy to patients
and families.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

31. In my organization, reporting an error may lead to job loss or prevent career advancement.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

32. In the event of a medical error that causes hospital admission or prolongs patient stay, my
routine practice is to report the error to at least one of the following entities: internal or
external reporting agency, supervisor, manager, physician chief, department leader, or health
care executive.
SA

A

MF

D

SD
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33. I usually expect patients to take optimal care of their health.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

34. My organization usually worries about medical malpractice.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

35. In my organization, clinical staff members are usually very competitive with one another.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

36. I usually fear that patients and families will initiate a malpractice lawsuit against me and/or
my organization.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

37. In the event of a medical error that results in a successful life-saving intervention, my
routine practice is to report the error to at least one of the following entities: internal or
external reporting agency, supervisor, manager, physician chief, department leader, or
health care executive.
SA

A

MF

D

SD

Please checkmark your answer or fill in the blank
What is your gender?
Male
Female
What is your marital status?
Single
Married
Divorced/Separated
Widowed
Other __________________
What is your ethnicity?
Caucasian
African American
Hispanic
Asian
American Indian
Other : _____________________
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What is your current occupation?
Staff or Attending Physician
Resident Physician
Other (please describe) __________________________
How much of your time is currently spent on direct patient care?
100%
75%
50%

25%
10%
What is your age? ______
What is your medical specialty? ______________________
Since board certification, how many years have you been working in your current
occupation? _______

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION
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Error Reporting Transparency
There are past instances of prev entable m edical errors that did no harm w hich I did
not form ally report.

Agree %
44.5

Mixed Feelings % Disagree % Missing %
14.8
39.6
1.1

In the ev ent of a m edical error that resu lts in no harm , m y rou tine practice is to
report the error to at least one of the follow ing entities: internal or external
reporting agency , su perv isor, m anager, phy sician chief, departm ent leader, or
health care execu tiv e.

53

24.4

20

2.6

In the ev ent of a m edical error that resu lts in an inju ry that is easily treated and
has no lasting effects, m y rou tine practice is to report the error to at least one of the
follow ing entities: internal or external reporting agency , su perv isor, m anager,
phy sician chief, departm ent leader, or health care execu tiv e.

61.1

22.2

15.6

1.1

There are past instances of prev entable m edical errors that resu lted in inju ry that is
easily treated and has no lasting effects w hich I did not form ally report.

22.6

15.2

61.1

1.1

In the ev ent of a m edical error that cau ses hospital adm ission or prolongs patient
stay , m y rou tine practice is to report the error to at least one of the follow ing
entities: internal or external reporting agency , su perv isor, m anager, phy sician
chief, departm ent leader, or health care execu tiv e.

68.9

18.9

9.2

3

In the ev ent of a m edical error that resu lts in a su ccessfu l life-sav ing interv ention ,
m y rou tine practice is to report the error to at least one of the follow ing entities:
internal or external reporting agency , su perv isor, m anager, phy sician chief,
departm ent leader, or health care execu tiv e.

66.7

18.1

10.7

4.4

Provider-Patient Transparency
My rou tine practice is to apologize to patients and fam ilies in the ev ent of a
prev entable m edical error.

Agree %
83.4

Mixed Feelings % Disagree % Missing %
13
3.7
0

There are past instances of prev entable m edical errors for w hich I did not apologize
to patients and fam ilies.

20.3

11.5

67

1.1

My rou tine practice is to express sy m pathy to patients and fam ilies in the ev ent of a
bad ou tcom e.

92.6

5.6

1.5

0.4

There are past instances of bad ou tcom es for w hich I did not express sy m pathy to
patients and fam ilies.

13

8.1

77.8

1.1

My rou tine practice is to prov ide patients and fam ilies w ith com plete explanations
for bad ou tcom es.

87.4

8.5

4

0

There are past instances of bad ou tcom es for w hich I did not prov ide com plete
explanations to patients and fam ilies.

18.5

11.1

69.3

1.1
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Medico-Legal Env ironm ent
Malpractice legislation in Florida protects m e against w rongfu l accu sations and
friv olou s law su its.
Patients and fam ilies are often inclined to initiate m alpractice litigation.

Agree %
7

Mixed Feelings % Disagree % Missing %
20.4
70.4
2.2

39.3
31.8

32.2
22.6

27.1
45.2

1.5
0.4

Malpractice litigation is a com m on occu rrence in m y organization.

21.9

16.3

58.5

3.3

My organization u su ally w orries abou t m edical m alpractice.

70.3

15.9

12.6

1.1

I u su ally fear that patients and fam ilies w ill initiate a m alpractice law su it against
m e and/or m y organization.

Socio-Organizational Clim ate
The error reporting policy in m y organization offers confidentiality to those w ho
report errors.

Agree %
58.8

Mixed Feelings % Disagree % Missing %
28.1
8.2
4.8

In m y organization, the repu tation of professionals w ho report or disclose m edical
errors is likely to be com prom ised.

13.3

25.6

58.6

2.6

The error reporting sy stem in m y organization is u su ally non-pu nitiv e.

49.6
11.8

34.8
25.2

10.3
57.4

5.2
5.6

In m y organization, clinical staff m em bers are u su ally v ery com petitiv e w ith one
another.

30

26.3

42.2

1.5

My organization u su ally offers m oral or em otional su pport to clinicians in the
afterm ath of a bad ou tcom e.

35.1

33

27

4.8

My organization encou rages error reporting.

69.2

21.1

8.6

1.1

My organization prov ides clear gu idelines on how to disclose bad ou tcom es to
patients and fam ilies.

32.9

35.2

29.6

2.2

My organization encou rages the disclosu re of bad ou tcom es.

55.5
40

30.7
30.7

10.4
24.8

3.3
4.4

In m y organization, reporting an error m ay lead to job loss or prev ent career
adv ancem ent.

My organization prov ides clear gu idelines on how to report errors.

Perfectionism
Criticism abou t m y perform ance as a clinician u su ally m akes m e feel defensiv e.
I hav e a tendency to striv e for excessiv ely high standards in healthcare.
Patients hav e u nu su ally high expectations of m e.
Healthcare has u nu su ally high expectations of m e.
My patients often disappoint m e.
I u su ally expect patients to take optim al care of their health.
I am u su ally concerned that m y failu res w ill disappoint patients or colleagu es.
Mistakes and failu res in healthcare u su ally cau se m e to feel sham e.
I am u su ally w illing to adm it w hen I am w rong in healthcare situ ations.
My professional cu ltu re u su ally encou rages learning from m istakes.

Agree %
36.7
91.1
59.3
61.5
12.6
64.1
71.5
43
89.6
84.9

Mixed Feelings % Disagree % Missing %
38.9
24.5
0
5.2
3
0.7
22.6
18.2
0
18.9
18.6
1.1
21.5
64.8
1.1
20
15.6
0.4
13.3
15.2
0
32.6
24
0.4
6.7
3
0.7
8.9
6.3
0

*To simplify reporting, the term “agree” signifies the consolidation of “agree” and “strongly agree” responses. Likewise,
“disagree” signifies the consolidation of “disagree” and “strongly disagree” responses.
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